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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Euro Area growth has picked up in the first six months of the year, with GDP 
growing by 0.8 per cent in the first quarter (quarter-on-quarter) and 0.9 per 
cent in the second quarter. This represents a considerable improvement on the 
average growth of just 0.5 per cent in the second half of 2005. The upturn was 
expected six months ago, but has been somewhat stronger than anticipated. 
This revision is due to unexpectedly strong export and investment growth in 
the Euro Area which has been boosted by unusually prolonged period of 
strong world economic growth. We do not expect growth to accelerate further 
in the second half of the year and anticipate a deceleration in growth from the 
last quarter. Overall, Euro Area GDP growth is expected to be 2.6 per cent for 
2006.  
 
The forecasts for 2007 and 2008 depend on the following policy assumptions. 
We expect the ECB to raise interest rates to 3.5 per cent at the end of this year 
and to leave them unchanged from then. Fiscal policy, which is only slightly 
restrictive this year, will be tightened next year at a Euro Area level. We project 
further fiscal consolidation up to 2008, with deficits expected to reach 1.4 per 
cent of GDP in 2008. Other assumptions include the oil price remaining at 
around $68 per barrel up to 2008 and the dollar/euro exchange rate rising only 
marginally to 1.31 by the end of 2008. 
 
We forecast more moderate growth in the Euro Area in 2007 and 2008 with 
GDP rising by around 2 per cent in both years. More restrictive budgetary 
policies in major Euro Area countries partly explain the softening next year. 
External factors will also play a role. The United States is forecast to grow by 
3.5 per cent in 2006, but growth is expected to moderate to 2.6 per cent in 
2007. Growth in Asia will also slowdown somewhat in 2007, particularly in 
China where growth is forecast to fall from 10.4 per cent in 2006 to 9.5 per 
cent in 2007. Globally, growth in 2008 is forecast to be at a similar level to 
2007. 
 
Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for the Euro Area 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GDP 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.0 
Inflation rate 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.0 
Unemployment rate 8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.6 7.5 
Govt. balance as % of GDP -2.6 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.4 
Note: the inflation rate is the HICP measure and the unemployment rate is the 
EUROSTAT standardised rate. 
 
Household consumption growth will slow down somewhat next year, mainly 
due to the negative impact of the VAT increase in Germany, but will 
experience a gradual recovery in 2008 supported by steady growth in real 
disposable incomes and continued employment growth. Government 
expenditure growth will slow reflecting the restrictive fiscal stance just noted. 
Private investment growth will slow due to less favourable demand prospects 
(both domestic and external) and higher interest rates. 
 
 
I 
 
 
 
Euro Area export growth will be restrained by the slowdown in export markets 
and exchange rates developments up to 2008. We expect export volume 
growth of 8 per cent this year before moderating to 5 per cent in the next two 
years. Import volumes will rise slightly more rapidly, leaving a small current 
account deficit at the Euro Area level, at below 1 per cent of GDP.  
 
A modest level of capacity utilization, a high level of the exchange rate and the 
expected moderation in energy prices will help keep inflation in check up to 
2008. Given our forecast for real GDP growth and slow growth in the 
potential labour force, the unemployment rate is expected to continue 
decreasing in the Euro Area, coming down to 7.5 per cent in 2008. 
 
Given the forecast for a slowdown in the US and the possibility that the actual 
slowdown could be more severe, a detailed analysis of the impact of a 
softening in the US is included in the report. Using the NiGEM (NIESR) 
model, the impact of shocks to house prices and housing investment are 
estimated, and also the impact of a combined shock. The house price shock 
assumes that prices fall by 20 per cent.1 The housing investment shock sees the 
ratio of this component of investment to GDP returning abruptly to its level in 
the 1990s. 
 
Focusing on the results for the combined impact, US output growth would 
slow by 0.6 per cent in the first year and by 1.0 per cent in the second, while 
the US current account would improve by almost 1 per cent of GDP. Euro 
Area output growth would slow by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points a year for 2 to 
3 years, but output would then recover. 
 
Additional analyses are also undertaken to explore the impacts of oil price 
shocks and changes in domestic demand in China. In the case of oil prices, a 
decrease of €10 per barrel, accompanied by OPEC spending the revenue at a 
pace similar to the last decade, is shown to produce limited effects. For 
example, the level of Euro Area GDP growth is increased by 0.18 per cent by 
the third year after the shock. In the case of changes of domestic demand in 
China, the impact of a 20 per cent fall in investment is simulated. The effects 
are also limited, with growth in euro area GDP being 0.24 per cent lower in the 
first year but only 0.06 per cent lower in the third year. 
 
The report includes a chapter in which macroeconomic differentials and 
adjustment in the Euro Area are analysed with a view to drawing lessons and 
policy implications for the better functioning of EMU and Euro Area enlargement.  
 
The following points are among the conclusions:  
 
EMU was successfully achieved with very little economic disruption. However, 
so far there have been no major asymmetric shocks affecting individual 
economies within the EMU. As a result, the potential effects of the loss of 
policy options inherent in a single currency area  have not yet been fully tested.  
 
Divergent output growth experienced across the membership of the EMU is 
primarily due to differences in underlying trend growth rates. Divergence in 
inflation rates is also to a significant extent due to country specific factors. 
 
Divergence in inflation rates has resulted in divergence in real interest rates 
experienced by households across the Euro area. While this has had differential 
effects on the housing market, these are probably limited in nature as the other 
drivers of the construction sector are more important in the longer term. 
                                                 
1 In the case of the house price shocks, the Priamo (Prometeia) is also used to simulate results. 
 II 
 
 
  
Nonetheless, the experience to date of EMU suggests that some governments 
may need to adjust their policies to deal with potential housing market bubbles. 
The loss of the instrument of monetary policy could be offset by a more 
targeted approach using fiscal policy. However, this has not yet been the 
practice in EMU, even in countries such as Spain and Ireland, which are 
suffering from serious inflationary pressures in that sector. For the new 
member states membership of EMU in the future could precipitate housing 
market booms and it will be important to prepare the ground for an 
appropriate use of fiscal policy to manage any risks that such an eventuality 
might entail. 
 
Because of structural differences in economies in the euro area there remains 
the possibility that supply side shocks could differentially affect one member 
economy, for example in the way that Finland was affected in 1989-90. Under 
such circumstances the discipline of EMU could slow adjustment to such a 
shock. If and when such shocks do occur increased reliance will have to be 
placed on promoting the rapid adaptation  of the economies so affected. 
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1. OUTLOOK FOR THE 
EURO AREA 
Global growth is expected to rise above 5 per cent this year and to taper off 
only gradually in the next two years. This would imply growth rates above 4.5 
per cent for five years in a row. Since 1975 annual growth has exceeded this 
threshold on only five occasions but never for two years in a row. High growth 
rates in China and other emerging markets together with rising production 
shares of these countries explain most of the current strength.1 Declining 
unemployment rates and improving public finance positions are forecast for 
most countries. Domestic inflation has picked up but core inflation rates 
remain remarkably low in view of the surge in crude oil and other commodity 
prices, particularly in Europe. Oil and commodity prices seem to have peaked 
in the summer. Monetary policies were tightened to control inflation in the 
current high growth environment. This policy cycle seems to have been 
completed in the Unites States but elsewhere official interest rates may show a 
further moderate rise in the near future.  
1.1 
Overview 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for the Euro Area 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
        
Output Growth Rate  0.9 0.8 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.0 
Inflation Rate 
(Harmonised) 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.0 
Unemployment Rate  8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.6 7.5 
Govt. balance as per cent 
of GDP
-2.6 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.4 
        
 
Euro Area growth has picked up in the first six months of the year with GDP 
growing by 0.8 per cent in the first quarter and 0.9 per cent in the second 
quarter. This represents a considerable improvement on the average growth of 
just 0.5 per cent in the second half and of 0.4 per cent in the first half of 2005. 
Strong demand for European exports remains important, but a recovery in 
investment is also making a significant contribution to the growth 
performance. GDP growth is projected at 2.6 per cent in 2006, the fastest rate 
since the year 2000. More restrictive budgetary policies in major Euro Area 
countries partly explain the softening next year to an average growth of 1.9 per 
cent. Growth in the UK remains above the Euro Area average. The 
performance of the New Member States continues to be very strong with 
growth rates close to the world average. The United States is forecast to grow 
by 3.5 per cent in 2006, but to fall back to 2.6 per cent in 2007. Growth in Asia 
will also decelerate somewhat in 2007, particularly in China.  
                                                 
1 We measure shares on a PPP-basis, implying a relative weight for China of 15.4 per cent in 
2005 against 3.4 per cent in 1980. 
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Table 1.2 compares the current EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP 
growth in major regions with the Spring forecasts. The outcome for world 
growth in the first half of 2006 was stronger than we anticipated six months 
ago. This reflects stronger growth both within the OECD (not least in the 
Euro Area), as well as outside the OECD (especially in China). While the 2007 
outlook for North America is slightly weaker than expected in our previous 
forecast, this is more than offset by stronger growth in Asia, especially China. 
 
Table 1.2: GDP Growth Forecasts in Autumn 2006 and Spring 2006 
  World NAFTA Euro Area China 
  Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn 
2006 4.7 5.2 3.0 3.5 2.2 2.6 9.2 10.4 
2007 4.4 4.7 3.1 2.6 2.0 1.9 8.2 9.5 
 
Several risks surround the outlook and some of these issues are studied in 
more detail in the report. Oil markets remain unpredictable: prices could come 
down more quickly if the balance between supply and demand improves more 
rapidly or if political tensions lessen more than assumed. But, of course, an 
increase in geopolitical problems could easily have the opposite effect. Internal 
demand in Europe may prove to be stronger than forecast, in view of declining 
unemployment and sound profitability in combination with pent-up demand. 
Current account imbalances, in particular the huge current account deficit of 
the United States, could bring about a much steeper decline of the US dollar 
relative to what we assume (see Section 1.4). US housing investment and real 
US house prices may decline more rapidly than forecast, with the latter 
undermining the consumption outlook.  
 
1.2 
Global Outlook 1.2.1 KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
Below we discuss some of the key developments in commodity and financial 
markets underlying our current forecast.  
OIL PRICES 
The spot price of Brent crude rose to new highs of nearly USD 80 per barrel in 
August. This price hike was not so much driven by strong demand but by 
increasing political turmoil in the Middle East and some other oil producing 
regions. Demand growth already started to moderate in 2005, in spite of the 
ongoing strong economic growth in the world (see Figure 1.2.1). Inventories 
also began to rise in the OECD countries during 2006, but this easing in the 
balance between supply and demand was not sufficient to neutralize the 
upward price pressure of increasing political tensions. Excess capacity is still 
lower than it used to be and consists mainly of sour crude, for which the 
current refining capacity for the production of high quality products is 
insufficient. This is illustrated by increasing price differentials for various 
grades of crude oil. 
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Figure 1.2.1: World Oil Demand and Production 
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 Sources:Oil Demand comes from the IEA Monthly Oil Reports, Industrial Production from the 
CPB and the volume of GDP from NIESR  
Following the seasonal easing in US demand and less acute political tensions in 
the Middle East, crude oil prices declined again in September, for example as 
of September 25th Brent had fallen to $61.45. However, strong global growth 
will keep the markets tight, as further reductions in demand and increases in 
supply that are brought about through new investments take time to 
materialize. A price rise due to a major disturbance in supply (or to 
expectations) also remains a serious risk. On balance, we have opted to revise 
upwards our oil price forecast over the forecast horizon to around USD 68 per 
barrel for the average of Brent and Dubai. 
 
Box 1.1: Demand and supply driven oil price shocks (An Analysis using 
NiGEM) 
The real effects of oil price shocks depend upon real factors such as the oil 
intensity of production and output, the scale of trade with oil producers and 
the speed with which they spend their money. They also depend upon whether 
they are a demand induced or a supply driven shift in the oil price. The 
nominal effects depend on the same things as well as the speed of reaction of 
the wage price system and monetary policy responses. We analyse the effects 
of changes in oil prices using NiGEM. The model has been restructured over 
the last few years to take account of changes in OPEC and of greater global 
pressures on inflation. OPEC domestic demand depends upon export 
revenues and on OPEC net assets and is estimated, as is the OPEC import 
equation which error corrects on Domestic Demand with an effect from net 
assets. Although it fits well, there is some evidencea that OPEC import 
demand might be stronger now than we would anticipate given past 
relationships, and we have ‘speeded up’ OPEC imports in our forecast. 
 
One ‘risk’ scenario to our forecast is that oil prices could fall, and in order to 
evaluate this we have undertaken a simulation of a $10 a barrel fall in oil prices. 
We assume that monetary policy makers will reduce interest rates in response 
to lower inflation, and as a result long term interest rates will fall, and equity 
prices will rise. All these factor contribute to stronger demand and lower 
inflation than in our baseline forecast, as we can see from the table. As we 
might expect the impacts on the US are more positive, as it uses more oil and 
trades less with oil producers than does the Euro Area. US wage and price 
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setters also display less inertia than those in Europe, and hence inflation reacts 
more quickly. 
 
 US GDP Euro Area GDP US Inflation 
Euro Area 
Inflation 
     
Year 1 0.05 0.07 -0.19 -0.20 
Year 2 0.17 0.13 -0.36 -0.25 
Year 3 0.30 0.18 -0.31 -0.19 
     
We can assume that the oil price rises we have seen over the last four years 
have been demand induced then the effects may have a similar pattern, but 
with the opposite sign, of those above. The negative output effects would 
perhaps be marginally smaller than a simple sign change would suggest, but the 
effects are essentially symmetric. We would only see a departure from 
symmetry if a country, such as Japan, were forced back into its liquidity trap by 
a fall in oil prices. It could not then cut interest rates to stabilise demand, and 
inflation would fall more than an inverted table would suggest. Of course, we 
could see a supply driven shock to oil prices emerge in the near future if 
political turmoil in the Gulf Region increases. We have undertaken an oil price 
shock that is accompanied by a reduction in both OPEC export capacity and 
in domestic demand. If OPEC output were to fall by 4 per cent, and hence 
imports fall by 7 per cent as oil prices rose, then the initial impacts on output 
in the Euro Area would be approximately double that suggested by inverting 
our table whilst the impact on the US would increase by about 80 per cent of 
that suggested by an inverted table. This change reflects trade patterns, as the 
Euro Area is more heavily dependent on OPEC than the US. (For the US 
OPEC represents two and a half  per cent of exports and hence 0.3 per cent of 
GDP whilst for the Euro Area it is four per cent of exports and hence 0.8 per 
cent of GDP). 
 
a AIECE, World Trade in 2005 and 2006, Brussels, November 2005 
INTEREST RATES 
In order to combat rising inflationary pressures, central banks have tightened 
monetary policy in all major countries. The Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) raised the Federal Funds rate by 25 basis points at each of its 
meetings from June 2004, to reach 5.25 per cent in June 2006, a total of 
seventeen increases. This reflects a cumulative rise of 425 basis points. During 
its meetings in August and September, the FOMC kept its policy rate 
unchanged, indicating a pause or the end to its tightening. The ECB has raised 
rates by 100 basis points to 3.0 per cent, while in July the Bank of Japan ended 
its zero rate policy and raised its rate to 0.25 per cent. The Bank of England 
raised the Base Rate by 25 basis points in August to 4.75 per cent, the first rise 
in a year. Figure 1.2.2 plots our current projections against projections 
underlying our Spring forecast. We see some further increases in the Euro 
Area by 50 basis points in the near term, and a levelling off thereafter. These 
higher interest rates reflect the stronger production outlook and increasing 
inflationary expectations. The US slowdown is projected to put official rates 
on hold for now, followed by cuts starting in the second half of next year and 
bringing the Federal Funds rate close to 4.5 per cent at the end of 2008. All 
key interest rate assumptions underlying our forecast projections are reported 
in Annex Table 5.  
 
Long-term interest rates have also risen slightly, but remain rather low in a 
historical perspective. There are a number of tentative explanations for the 
current low long-term interest rates, including high savings versus lagging 
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investments and the growing credibility of monetary policies. Figure 1.2.3 
illustrates the revisions of our long-term interest rate projections since Spring. 
For the United States, a minor drop in the capital market rate is projected for 
2007 and 2008, while the rate for the Euro Area is projected to be stable at 
around 4 per cent.  
 
Figure 1.2.2: 3-Month Money Market Rates 
 
Figure 1.2.3: 10-year Government Bond Yields 
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EXCHANGE RATES 
The euro nominal effective exchange rate rose about 5 per cent since the end 
of 2005, if measured for the area as a whole versus the rest of the world.  The 
effective appreciation for individual countries was less, because of the 
mitigating effects stemming from trade amongst these countries. The euro 
appreciated against the US dollar and the yen, but also against minor currencies 
that were hit by the financial turbulence in May-June, such as the Hungarian 
forint, the Turkish lira, the Icelandic krona and the South African rand. Some 
recovery of the yen is incorporated in our forecast, while the US dollar is seen 
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to depreciate further, albeit marginally. Figure 1.2.4 shows our current effective 
exchange rate projections. 
 
Figure 1.2.4: Effective Exchange Rates 
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EQUITY PRICES 
Equity markets experienced some turbulence in May and June but have mostly 
recovered since then. The downturn was the first major equity price drop since 
Spring 2003 when markets started to recover from the ICT collapse and 
bookkeeping scandals in the preceding years. Due to the recovery after mid-
June, share prices in the United States and all Euro Area countries are currently 
higher than at the end of last year.  
 
Interest rates and share prices are closely linked, in part because bonds and 
shares represent alternative asset choices for financial investors. Investors hold 
a portfolio of assets, and the mix of this portfolio differs across countries and 
may shift over time. A rising preference for equities over bonds would push 
share prices up and bond prices down, and hence bond yields would rise. 
Financial asset preferences are partly driven by risk aversion, with investors 
tending to favour bonds over equities as they become more risk averse. In the 
current situation investors seem to have a preference for equities as interest 
rates are expected to be stable or to rise only slightly. 
1.2.2 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
North America 
The sharp acceleration of US GDP in the first quarter of 2006, which was 
linked to the reconstruction efforts after the hurricanes of August and 
September 2005, proved to be temporary. Growth slowed in the second 
quarter due to a slowing in the growth rate of domestic demand. There was a 
sharp drop in housing investment but also an easing in the growth rates of 
private consumption and business investment. Improvements in international 
trade were only marginal. From February, the monthly trade deficit of goods 
and services had decreased as exports outperformed imports. However, in July 
nominal exports were lower than in June, whereas imports of goods continued 
to increase. The core inflation rate has increased over the past months and was 
2.8 per cent in August. This is, however, still relatively low when compared 
with previous situations of high commodity price increases and strong 
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economic growth. Nevertheless, it is still worrying according to the Fed 
chairman’s “comfort zone” which ranges from 1 to 2 per cent. 
  
We expect US growth to moderate over the forecast horizon and to decline 
from 3.4 per cent in 2006 to 2.5 per cent in 2007 and to 2.4 in 2008. The main 
reason for the lower growth is the fading contribution of the housing market. 
In the years 2003-2005 residential investment alone contributed almost half a 
percentage point a year to GDP growth, with residential investment as a 
proportion of GDP rising to 5.5 per cent from an average of 4.5 per cent in 
the previous decade. In addition, increasing house prices produced significant 
wealth effects on private consumption. Since the beginning of the year 
downward signals from the housing market have been increasing. New 
housing starts and new housing permits have been declining and in August 
these indices reached their lowest levels since the beginning of 2003. House 
prices are also decelerating. In the second quarter of 2006 the quarter on 
quarter growth rate of the OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight) nationwide index showed growth of only 1.2 per cent, the lowest 
quarterly growth rate since the end of 1999. This deceleration in house prices 
continued through the summer according to monthly indicators.  
 
We anticipate a gradual correction of both residential investment and house 
prices. Residential investment as share of GDP is expected to fall gradually 
towards the historical norm, but to remain above it in the forecasting period. 
House prices are expected to record slower nominal increases for several years, 
rather than a sharp drop of the nominal levels (see Figure 1.2.5). A different 
scenario is, however, discussed in Section 1.4 below. The slow increase in 
house prices implies weak growth in housing wealth. When combined with 
higher interest rates and reduced scope for house-equity releases, the softening 
on house prices will contribute to reducing real private consumption growth, 
as well as residential investments. In spite of these negatives, the relatively 
good condition of the labour market and the expected stabilisation of 
commodity prices will help to sustain real disposable income, thereby 
offsetting to some degree the negative impact on private consumption growth. 
High capacity utilization and strong gains in corporate profits will support 
business investment. However, we anticipate a moderation in investment 
growth in 2007 and 2008.  
 
Inflationary pressures, fed by higher energy prices, have not yet begun to ease. 
In the first six months of the year, the rise in hourly compensation in the non-
farm sector was only partly offset by an increase of productivity. As a result, 
labour cost per unit of output grew by 4.3 per cent, compared to just 2 per 
cent in 2005. This suggests that inflation measured by the private consumption 
deflator will be 3.2 per cent in both 2006 and 2007. Only in 2008 will the 
disinflationary effects of the downward economic cycle and stabilising 
commodity prices combine to produce an easing in inflation, with a rate of 2.1 
per cent expected.  
 
As regards the external imbalance, slowing domestic demand growth will 
restrain imports and the stability of the dollar and the effective exchange rate 
will allow exports to rise roughly in line with world trade. On balance, we 
expect the current account deficit to improve by less than one per cent of 
GDP in the forecast horizon. 
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Figure 1.2.5: US House Price Growth (OFHEO Index) 
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In Canada increasing employment, high growth of real disposable income and 
increasing household net worth continue to sustain private consumption and 
housing activity. However, the appreciation of the Canadian dollar has 
impacted negatively on exports. A deceleration of GDP growth in the second 
quarter was partially unexpected. It involved both domestic demand and 
exports, with exports having a negative quarterly growth rate for the second 
quarter in a row.  
 
Both upside and downside risks characterise the evolution of the Canadian 
economy. The upside risks involve private consumption and housing prices, 
whereas the downside risks relate to a possible correction in US imbalances. 
We expect some deceleration of GDP growth over the forecasting period 
driven initially by a reduction in exports that subsequently results in slower 
domestic demand growth.  
 
In Mexico, the appreciation of the peso, relatively low inflation and an increase 
in employment sustained domestic demand and facilitated stable quarterly 
GDP growth in the second quarter. However, the expected deceleration of US 
and Canadian domestic demand will imply a slowdown of export demand 
growth. 
 
For the region as a whole we expect economic growth to slow down from 3.5 
per cent in 2006 to 2.6 per cent in 2007 and 2008.  
Asia 
The Asian economies continue to expand at a fast pace although with some 
signs of moderation in the second quarter. Both domestic demand and external 
trade contributed to the result which is heavily influenced by the impressive 
growth of the Chinese economy, and also favoured by strong growth 
elsewhere around the globe. The signs of moderation come mainly from the 
slight slowdown of domestic demand in many countries, with the notable 
exception of China, and external demand is growing at a slower pace too.  
 
The Chinese economy is ballooning (11.3 per cent the year-on-year GDP 
growth in the second quarter), with a record external surplus, a boom in 
investment and a good performance in other components of domestic 
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demand. As the investment growth, at over 30 per cent annual in the first six 
months, was seen as having an overheating potential the authorities have tried 
to cool down the expansion with both monetary restrictions and administrative 
measures. The monetary authorities raised the 1-year benchmark lending 
interest rate in two steps of 27 basis points (reaching 6.12 per cent) and 
increased the commercial bank reserve requirement. They also adopted a 
bundle of other measures to absorb liquidity, a very difficult task in a country 
running a huge current account surplus. Moreover, because of an increasing 
amount of unsold property and growing speculative activity in real estate (a 
quarter of the total investment was channelled there) the authorities are 
resolved to limit the expansion of investment in this sector with further 
administrative and lending regulations. In reality, the impact of the policy 
measures is likely to be moderate. Many factors such as poor financial and 
capital markets operate to limit their transmission and effectiveness, possibly 
resulting in just a small dent in growth in the short run. The impact of a 
different outcome on the outlook is discussed in Box 1.2 below. 
 
In Japan private consumption and non-residential investment are maintaining a 
good pace of expansion, driven by higher real household income and high 
profitability. The slowdown in the second quarter resulted from a sharp 
contraction in residential and public investment, a correction in inventories, 
and a narrowing net trade surplus. The monetary authority did not raise the 
interest rate further after the first hike in July, given the uncertainty about the 
price evolution (a revision of the price index added some doubts about the 
dynamics of inflation) and also the moderation in the GDP expansion. The 
economies of South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and India are performing 
well, taking advantage of the economic expansion in China, international 
demand for electronics and for IT-related services. 
 
The short-term outlook for the Asian countries is quite positive even if a 
deceleration in the second half of this year is likely to occur. Monetary policy, 
and more generally economic policy in some countries, has been tightened, 
trying to deal with overheating sectors (mainly real-estate) and, at the same 
time, to cool down some inflationary pressures arising from increasing oil and 
commodity prices and also buoyant consumption. Oil and commodity prices 
are still very high. In addition, subsidies to retail prices, lower taxes and duties 
put in place by many governments to deal with high prices are very costly to 
maintain so high price levels and the ongoing reduction of subsidies are likely 
to dent purchasing power. External demand is expected to slow, driven by the 
forecast deceleration of the United States economy. On the other hand, we 
predict that Chinese economic growth will remain strong. Investment growth 
is likely to remain strong in the coming years, mainly in infrastructural facilities, 
capacity building and also investment related to the Olympic Games in 2008. 
The tighter commercial links among Asian countries and the consolidated role 
of China as an important importer will favour the exports of the countries of 
this region, offsetting, at least partially, the smaller contribution of US demand 
and weaker domestic demand. India will maintain a high pace of growth, 
increasing the share of manufacturing in the economy, although dependence 
on the agricultural sector will remain relatively high.  
 
The performance of the Japanese economy in 2006 will be strong, given the 
first half of the year but some signals of weakening are arising in industrial 
production. The inflation rate is likely to rise but at a moderate pace, given that 
the recent increase has been mainly due to the surge in import prices (oil and 
commodities) and these are projected to stabilise over the forecast horizon. 
With inflation remaining modest, the speed of interest rate hikes will be limited 
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and monetary policy will remain stimulative over the forecast horizon. Fiscal 
policy in Japan is expected to remain restrictive, under the government plans 
of moving to a primary budget balance of around zero in 2010 from the 
current situation of a deficit of around 4 per cent of GDP. In the process of 
achieving fiscal balance, growth in public consumption and investment will 
have to be very much restrained, especially as the government wants to avoid 
substantial tax increases. Moreover the projected appreciation of the yen vis-à-
vis the dollar and the US slow down could lower external demand, containing 
GDP growth in a range of 2 to 2.5 per cent.  
 
Box 1.2: Domestic demand in China 
Chinese growth has been strong for several years, with annual growth of 
around 10 per cent between 2003 and (projected) 2006, the strongest pace 
since the period up to 1996 when a realignment took place. However, it is not 
clear that the economy can be regarded as balanced, being heavily dependant 
on export growth and with up to 50 per cent of GDP going into investment. 
There are risks of a significant investment driven slowdown, especially if there 
are fears of a trade war with the US or of a significant, albeit temporary, loss of 
competitiveness because of a revaluation. 
 
In order to evaluate the impacts of a Chinese slowdown using NiGEM we 
reduce investment by 20 per cent in 2007 but revert toward path thereafter. 
The simulation is of an endogenous shock so feedback mechanisms are in 
place and we report results for GDP in China, the US and the Euro Area 
below. We assume that the currency is allowed to float (down) and that interest 
rates target inflation. GDP growth would slow by 3 per cent, and imports 
would fall 20 per cent and then recover as domestic demand initially falls by 10 
per cent. Floating the currency gives an immediate 4 per cent (real) devaluation 
which helps to absorb the shock. Fixing the exchange rate increases the shock 
to Chinese GDP by 1 per cent by removing immediate competitiveness effects, 
whilst the shock elsewhere is reduced. The impacts on the Euro Area and the 
US are not negligible, in part because China is a major market for both, but 
also because the decline in the exchange rate means Chinese exports become 
more competitive. Hence net exports in the US and in the Euro Area are 
reduced and growth slows by up to a quarter of a per cent in the first year. 
 
Effects on GDP: Percentage Difference from Baseline 
 China US Euro Area 
    
2006 -3.14 -0.21 -0.24 
2007 -1.23 0.00 -0.13 
2008 -1.44 0.06 -0.06 
    
 
Non Euro Area European Economies 
The UK economy has been growing above its trend rate for the first half of 
this year, at between 0.7 and 0.8 per cent per quarter. The available data 
suggests this has continued into the third quarter. This is an improvement on 
the below trend growth of 2005, which was led by a sharp moderation in 
consumer spending growth. Robust job creation continued despite the 
slowdown of the UK economy in 2005, resulting in poor productivity growth. 
Annual average jobs growth in 2005 matched the 0.8 per cent expansion of the 
labour force. Behind this robust labour force growth is the recent strong 
migration to the UK economy. Since 2001, strong labour force growth and 
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weak business investment growth has meant that the capital to labour ratio in 
the UK has waned. The resurgence in economic growth this year has been 
driven partly by business investment, supported by strong profit growth, and 
this has allowed a partial correction to the capital-labour ratio.  
 
The outlook for economic growth remains robust. Growth of 2.7 per cent per 
annum is forecast for 2006-2008. This above trend growth is supported by a 
more balanced economy, being less reliant on household consumption 
expenditure than in the recent past as gross fixed investment gathers 
momentum. The housing market in the UK has shown some signs of an 
increase in activity, although this is assumed to be temporary. The rate of 
house price growth is expected to be below that of incomes over the 
projection period, allowing real house prices to revert towards their long-run 
equilibrium. With the rate of jobs growth below that of the labour force, the 
unemployment rate is expected to continue to rise from 5.5 per cent this year 
to 5¾ per cent in 2007 and 2008. The loosening of the labour market seen 
recently will have helped to put some downward pressure on inflation, as will 
the appreciation of sterling in the first half of 2006.  Nonetheless, annual 
inflation is above its target of 2 per cent, and is expected to remain there for 
the next three years.  
 
The general government budget deficit is expected to improve to just below 3 
per cent of GDP this year, due to more robust economic growth and the tax 
generating policies introduced in the last few fiscal plans. In 2008 we have 
assumed that government expenditure as a share of the economy begins to 
decline, which is necessary if the UK government is to meet its self-imposed 
fiscal rules. We expect the UK to meet the fiscal rules as set out in the 
Maastricht treaty with some room to spare in 2007 and 2008. 
 
The rebound of the Swedish and Danish economies started earlier than the 
Euro Area. In both countries growth is still gaining more momentum from 
strengthening Euro Area demand. In Denmark strong growth of both private 
consumption and investment are now being added to by stronger exports. 
More robust economic activity together with tight labour market policies 
pushed the standardised unemployment rate below 4 per cent last summer, 
thereby raising fears of overheating. Growth is expected to remain strong in 
2007-8 supported by fairly strong export demand. 
 
In Sweden strong exports and investment is supported by brisk consumption. 
Public consumption was boosted in advance of the parliamentary elections 
held recently. As a result of the election, power shifted from the social 
democrats to a coalition led by moderate conservatives by a thin margin. The 
coalition has stressed the need to decrease taxation but major changes in 
economic policies will not be easy to implement in the forecast period. The 
slowing in export markets will lead to a gradual cooling of the strong export 
performance.  
 
Russian GDP is growing strongly as a result of growth in private consumption 
and fixed investment. In the first half of 2006 GDP growth reached 6.5 per 
cent on an annual basis. Growth is largely driven by the trade and 
manufacturing sectors. Although the energy sector does not record significant 
growth any longer, high energy prices translate into high government revenues 
and lead to a surplus in the public budget. Higher prices as a consequence of 
higher demand for oil and gas have greatly contributed to the export 
performance. The economic expansion over the past years has been 
accompanied by excess liquidity and high inflation. Since its introduction in 
  
 
12 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
2004, the government stabilization fund has helped to sterilize some of the 
effects of soaring oil revenues on the domestic economy. Because of weaker 
growth in the world economy, GDP growth will be slightly lower over the 
forecast horizon. Economic performance will depend heavily on the 
conditions for business investment. In particular, the government has to 
convince the business community that it will limit the influence of the state on 
the economy. 
 
The economic performance in the New Member States of the EU (NMS) has 
been very strong in the first half of 2006, with weighted GDP expected to 
grow by as much as 5.8 per cent on an annual basis (weighted by 2000 GDP 
shares at PPPs). The acceleration in the rate of growth compared to 2005 is 
coming mainly from a much better performance of the Polish economy. 
Further growth in employment and real wages as well as indexation of 
pensions and a lowering of the savings rate led to robust household 
consumption growth. Also, investment demand gained momentum, where the 
engine is the companies’ outlays apart from EU financed investments. Strong 
exports (to EU, as well as to Eastern European and developing countries) are 
the source of the positive net export contribution to GDP.  
 
The Polish economy is expected to grow by about 5.2 per cent this year. Some 
slow down in the Polish economy in 2007-8 will result from a moderation in 
consumption and net exports. In 2006 robust growth is expected to continue 
in the Czech Republic, in Slovakia and in the Baltic States, based on very 
strong domestic demand and a positive net export contribution. In 2007-8 we 
forecast some slow down in the Czech Republic and also in Estonia and 
Latvia. The Hungarian economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate, due in 
part to fiscal adjustment and a restrictive monetary policy. Largely as a result of 
slower growth in both Poland and the Czech Republic in the coming years, we 
see weighted GDP in NMS growing by 5.0 per cent and 4.6 per cent in 2007 
and in 2008 respectively. 
 
Inflation in NMS has been relatively low in recent months, at levels below or 
in line with those in the Euro Area. Three countries, Estonia, Latvia and 
Slovakia, stand out with inflation above 4 per cent due to the combination of 
energy and administrative price hikes as well as an acceleration in food prices. 
The outlook for the rest of 2006 looks very favourable with an average 
inflation forecast of 2.4 per cent, in line with the forecast for the Euro Area. 
Low inflation can be mostly attributed to EU-wide deflation in non-energy 
industrial goods prices and is further strengthened across the NMS by 
appreciating currencies (in most countries) and an expansion in large-surface 
retail chains. Inflation is projected to rise somewhat in 2007 to 2.9 per cent and 
then to fall slightly to 2.8 per cent in 2008. HICP in Poland, the country with a 
close to 50 per cent weight in NMS, will remain one of the lowest-inflation 
economies, both in the region and within the EU due to continued deflation in 
tradable goods aided by currency appreciation and increasing competition in 
the retail sector. Slovenia will become the first NMS country to join the euro 
zone in January 2007, having met all three convergence criteria, with moderate 
inflation, low interest rates and a budget deficit within the limits of the 
Maastrict Treaty. The upturn in inflation in Hungary in 2007 will be caused by 
tax adjustments and should be temporary.  
 
Euro Area growth has picked up in the first six months of the year, with GDP 
growing by 0.8 per cent in the first quarter (quarter-on-quarter) and 0.9 per 
cent in the second quarter, up from average growth of only 0.5 per cent in the 
second half of 2005. This has brought annual Euro Area GDP growth to 2.6 
1.3 Euro Area 
detail 
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per cent instead of a mere 1.2 per cent a year earlier. The upturn was expected 
six months ago, but has been somewhat stronger than anticipated.  
 
Both domestic and external demand have contributed to the acceleration in 
growth. Within domestic demand, investment has been the main engine for 
growth, contributing 0.9 percentage points to the 2.6 per cent annual GDP 
growth. Against the background of an improving situation in labour markets, 
growth in household consumption has strengthened on average in the first half 
of this year, although growth in the second quarter was dampened by another 
strong increase in energy prices. Government consumption also rose slightly 
faster when compared with the second half of last year. The most important 
factor behind the stronger GDP growth, however, has been an upturn in fixed 
investment which rose by 1.5 per cent on average in the first two quarters of 
2006, compared to 0.8 per cent in the third and fourth quarters of last year. 
Investment in machinery and equipment has picked up reflecting rising 
capacity utilization, high profits and improved sales expectations. At the same 
time, available information on residential construction in the Euro Area 
countries suggests that housing investment has strengthened, although with 
fluctuations as a result of weather. The picture for the Euro Area is partly the 
result of a pick-up in Germany where the recession in construction that has 
been a drag on growth for many years2 finally seems to have come to an end.  
Exports have risen substantially in the first six months of this year and grew 
considerably stronger than imports. As a result, net exports made a significant 
positive contribution to GDP growth, especially in the first quarter.  
 
However, the acceleration of Euro Area growth is still modest after several 
years of subdued activity, particularly when compared to the expansion 
registered in 2000 when annual GDP growth peaked at 3.9 per cent for the 
year. We do not expect growth to accelerate further in the second half of the 
year and anticipate a deceleration in growth from the last quarter. This is in line 
with the Euro Growth indicator (see Box 1.3). European business surveys 
ceased to register improvements in August, with the deterioration being 
particularly marked in industry.  More importantly, the forward looking 
components of the surveys, most noticeably in Germany, suggest a weaker 
outlook for the months ahead. 
 
The less favourable outlook depicted by the latest business surveys is 
associated with a number of negative factors that are likely to affect Euro Area 
growth in the coming months. These include the prospect of a slowdown in 
the US economy and somewhat slower growth in other parts of the world, 
especially Asia, and also the rise of the real exchange rate. In addition, the past 
increase in the ECB’s interest rates, the expected future rises in rates and a 
contractionary fiscal stance will dampen growth. The announced VAT rise in 
Germany from January 2007 may, however, lead to significant frontloading of 
consumption and housing investment in Germany into 2006 supporting 
growth towards the end of this year at the cost of next year. The frontloading 
of demand is expected to affect output in other countries in the Euro Area as 
well, especially those in which a substantial part of production is serving 
demand for big ticket items in Germany such as automobiles, as is the case for 
example in Austria3.   
 
                                                 
2 See Gern and Meier (2006) (Annex Paper A1) for a discussion of the importance of residential 
construction in explaining the growth performance in individual countries available at 
http://www.euroframe.org/efn.  
3 The forward shift of Austrian manufacturing exports to Germany from 2007 to 2006, for 
example may amount to up to 2 per cent, resulting in a forward shift of total exports of about 
0.5 per cent. The effect on GDP is estimated to be about 0.2 per cent. 
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The stronger than expected upturn in the first half of this year is the main 
reason for an upward revision of our Euro Area real GDP forecast for 2006 
which now stands at 2.6 per cent compared to 2.2 per cent six months ago.4 At 
a country level, growth has been revised upwards for almost all countries, 
except for France, where our forecast remains unchanged at 2.2 per cent. 
Concerning the pattern of intra Euro Area growth, there is a major change 
from previous years as the significant negative growth differential between 
Germany and the Euro Area average which had been a consistent feature of 
the Euro Area since its inception almost disappears in 2006, although this is 
probably a temporary phenomenon. France is expected to grow at around the 
Euro Area average, whereas growth in Italy and Portugal is expected to be 
below 2 per cent. All four countries are expected to be below the Euro Area 
average again next year and in 2008, partly because they remain in the process 
of tightening their fiscal policies in order to meet the European commitments 
on public deficits. At the same time, Ireland and Finland and to a lesser extent 
Spain and Greece continue to record relatively high growth rates. The forecast 
Finnish growth of almost 5 per cent this year, however, is exaggerated by the 
base effect from the production losses in the paper industry that had occurred 
in 2005.  
 
Figure 1.3.2: Euro Area Output Growth 
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  Source: Eurostat, EUROFRAME-EFN Autumn 2006 forecasts 
 
Box 1.3: Short-term prospects for Euro Area GDP growth suggested by 
the Euro Growth indicator 
On the basis of data available in early September, the Euro growth indicator 
prepared by EUROFRAME for the FTD forecasts year-on-year Euro Area 
GDP growth of 3.25 per cent in 2006 Q3, following estimated growth of 2.85 
per cent growth in 2006 Q2 (2.65 per cent according to Eurostat figures 
released on 1 September). The indicator suggests that GDP growth will only 
slightly accelerate in 2006 Q3 in year-on-year terms before decelerating 
towards the end of the year. The main contributions to the rise in the indicator 
in 2006 Q3 remain business surveys, primarily in industry and to a lesser extent 
in the retail trade and construction sectors. The contributions of business 
                                                 
4 All GDP data and forecasts discussed in the text and reported in the tables are adjusted for 
working-day variation. Under the effect of fewer working days in 2006 as compared to 2005, the 
unadjusted numbers show German GDP growth of 2.2 per cent in 2006, as opposed to 2.4 per 
cent on an adjusted basis, and of 1.3 next year (as opposed to 1.4). 
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surveys to the indicator reached levels close to their 2000 peaks in July, 
following a one year recovery. 
 
However, the indicator points to a deceleration of activity towards the end of 
the year. This reflects the end of the improvement in Euro Area business 
surveys in August, with opinions deteriorating for the first time in 14 months 
in the industrial sector. Most of the other components of the indicator also 
point to a deceleration in activity in the Euro Area: the ISM survey of US 
industry, which depicts the effects of the US economic developments on 
European growth, has been losing strength for roughly two years, reflecting 
the slowdown of the US economy. The past appreciation of the real 
euro/dollar exchange rate will also exert a negative influence on Euro Area 
GDP growth, with the main negative contribution to GDP growth coming 
from the tightening of monetary policy in the Euro Area over the last quarters, 
according to the indicator.  
 
The forecasts for 2007 and 2008 depend on the following policy assumptions. 
We expect the ECB to raise interest rates to 3.5 per cent at the end of this year 
and to leave them unchanged from then (see Chapter 2, Section 1 on monetary 
policy). Fiscal policy which is only slightly restrictive this year will be tightened 
next year at a Euro Area level (see Chapter 2, Section 2). We project further 
fiscal consolidation up to 2008, with deficits expected to reach 1.4 per cent of 
GDP in 2008. Consolidation will be especially pronounced in Germany with 
the reduction in the structural deficit amounting to ¾ of a percentage point in 
2007. We expect significant fiscal tightening also in Italy in 2007 and in 2008, 
bringing the government deficit below 3 per cent of GDP that year. For 
France, we expect a smaller tightening of fiscal policy, leaving the deficit below 
3 per cent of GDP in the coming two years. All in all, monetary and fiscal 
policies will be tightened at the Euro Area level in the coming months. 
 
Against this background we forecast more moderate growth in the Euro Area 
with GDP rising by around 2 per cent in both years (see Table 1.1). Domestic 
demand will rise slightly faster in both years (at around 2.1 per cent). 
Household consumption growth will slow down somewhat next year, mainly 
due to the negative impact of the VAT increase in Germany, but will 
experience a gradual recovery in 2008 supported by steady growth in real 
disposable incomes and continued employment growth. Government 
expenditure growth will slow reflecting an overall restrictive fiscal stance 
associated with European commitments. Private investment growth will 
progressively slow under the effect of less favourable demand prospects (both 
domestic and external) and higher interest rates. 
 
Euro Area export growth will be restrained by the slowdown of export 
markets and exchange rates developments up to 2008. The high level of the 
euro exchange rate will allow countries to at best stabilise their market shares. 
This will be the case for Germany but other countries will continue losing 
competitiveness (Italy, Spain and France to a lesser extent). We expect export 
volume growth of 8 per cent this year before moderating to 5 per cent in the 
next two years, slightly less rapidly than Euro Area market growth.5 Import 
volumes will rise slightly more rapidly, leaving a small current account deficit at 
the Euro Area level, at below 1 per cent of GDP, with Germany running a 
surplus higher than 3 per cent of GDP and Spain a deficit of 7 per cent of 
GDP.  
                                                 
5It may be worth noting that there is currently increasing uncertainty with respect to the 
reliability of export and import data due to VAT fraud which may have substantially inflated 
recorded trade. Such effects have recently been visible especially in the UK, but may also be of 
significance in the Euro Area. 
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Table 1.1: Euro Area Forecast 
 2002  2003   2004   2005 2006  2007 2008 
Consumption                             0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.8 1.6 2.0 
Private investment                     -3.5 2.1 3.3 3.2 4.7 4.3 2.9 
Government expenditure             2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.3 1.4 1.5 
Stockbuilding(a)                       -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Total domestic demand                   0.1 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.6 2.0 2.1 
Export volumes                          1.7 1.1 6.3 4.5 8.3 4.8 5.4 
Import volumes                          0.3 3.1 6.2 5.5 8.1 4.8 5.6 
        
GDP 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.0 
        
Average earnings                        4.0 2.9 2.2 2.0 2.7 3.4 3.2 
Harmonised consumer prices    2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.0 
Private consumption deflator       1.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.1 
Real personal disposable income  1.5 0.9 1.4 0.8 1.1 2.0 1.9 
Standardised Unemployment, %  8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.6 7.5 
Govt. balance as % of GDP          -2.6 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.4 
Govt. debt as % of GDP             68.1 69.3 69.8 70.8 68.9 67.5 65.9 
Current account as % of GDP   0.7 0.4 0.6 -0.3 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 
a change as a per cent of GDP 
 
In contrast to other industrial countries consumer price inflation has not risen 
significantly in recent years at the Euro Area level despite the continued strong 
increase in the price of oil and other commodities. The inflation rate as 
measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) has been 
fluctuating at levels between 2 and 2 ½ per cent during the past two and a half 
years (see Figure 1.3.2). With the energy component rising strongly, core 
inflation has slowed to 1.5 per cent. A modest level of capacity utilization, a 
high level of the exchange rate and the expected moderation in energy prices 
will help keep inflation in check up to 2008. We expect increases in real wages 
to pick up somewhat over the forecast horizon but for these increases to 
remain moderate.  
 
Figure 1.3.2: Consumer price inflation in the Euro Area 
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The acceleration of growth up to the middle of 2006 has facilitated a fall in the 
unemployment rate, which reached 7.8 per cent in July 2006 compared to 8.6 
per cent a year earlier. Given our forecast for real GDP growth and slow 
growth in the potential labour force, the unemployment rate is expected to 
continue decreasing at the Euro Area level, coming down to 7.5 per cent in 
2008. Unemployment will remain higher than the average in Greece, France 
and Germany.  
 
The persistent differences in growth dynamics, inflation rates and current 
account balances across countries that have been apparent in the Euro Area6 
are anticipated to remain in place over the forecast horizon, although there is 
some convergence expected with respect to inflation in 2007 and 2008. We do 
not expect major problems with respect to the financing of current account 
imbalances, at least in the short-term, although a drying up of capital inflows 
may, at some point, pose a risk to the outlook in countries running large 
deficits. In particular, the Spanish position could become more difficult in the 
event of a rapid cooling of the housing market. Other major downwards risks 
associated with our Euro Area forecasts are a sharper deceleration of US 
output together with a fall of the dollar (See Section 1.4).    
  
The forecast is based on the following assumptions: 
The oil price is projected to remain at around $68 per barrel up to 2008. 
 
The exchange rate of the US$ to the euro is expected to remain almost 
unchanged, depreciating slightly from 1.28 in 2006 Q3 to 1.31 at the end of 
2008.  
 
The three-month interest rate in the Euro Area is projected to be 3.5 per cent 
at the end of 2006 and then to remain at 3.6 per cent until the end of 2008. 
 
The forecasts are based on data available up to 14th September 2006. The 
assumptions for commodity prices, exchange rates and interest rates used in 
the forecast were constructed by consensus, as the average projections of the 
10 EUROFRAME-EFN Institutes. These are broadly consistent with current 
financial market expectations and forward markets.  
GERMANY  
German economic growth has greatly improved since the second half of 2005. 
On a quarter-on-quarter basis, real GDP growth has accelerated to 0.7 per cent 
and 0.9 per cent in the first and second quarters of 2006, respectively, up from 
an average of 0.4 per cent in the preceding two quarters. The upturn in 
economic activity is mainly due to a recovery of domestic demand. Business 
investment has significantly accelerated and private consumption has begun to 
rebound after a prolonged period of stagnation. In addition, construction 
seems to have recovered after years of decline. Due to accelerating domestic 
demand, imports also rose at a stronger pace. As a consequence, the 
contribution of foreign trade to GDP growth has declined, despite a strong 
export performance. Unemployment has continued to decrease from the peak 
reached in early 2005. While the reduction during the last year was mainly 
caused by the Hartz IV labour market reforms and the impact it had on 
statistically reported unemployment, the improvement in output growth has 
increasingly led to employment growth in 2006. The public deficit is expected 
                                                 
6 The development and significance of macroeconomic differentials within the euro area is 
discussed in detail as a special topic of this report and a number of background papers are 
available on the EUROFRAME-EFN website: http://www.euroframe.org. 
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to fall below the level predicted in Spring, due to the strong economic 
recovery. 
 
Our forecast for real GDP growth7 is 2.4 per cent in 2006 and 1.4 per cent in 
2007. The slower expected growth next year is partly due to a weaker external 
environment and the stronger euro exchange rate dampening export growth 
and to higher interest rates. The relatively pronounced deceleration compared 
to the rest of the Euro Area, however, is partly due to the impacts of fiscal 
policy. Major measures8 include a rise in the regular rate of VAT by 3 
percentage points and a hike in the insurance tax rate. In general, the additional 
tax revenues will be used to reduce the budget deficit, which is expected to fall 
to 1.9 per cent next year. About one third of the revenues are scheduled to 
finance a reduction of the rate of contribution to the unemployment insurance 
scheme by 2 percentage points. At the same time, however, contributions to 
the public pension scheme and the public health insurance schemes will be 
raised by a total of probably 0.8 percentage points, which is 0.2 percentage 
points more than had been expected in the Spring. As a result, total social 
security contribution rates will fall by only 1.2 percentage points. 
 
Although the overall impact of the package on growth over the medium term 
has been found to be limited in simulations using the NiGEM model  (see the 
EUROFRAME-EFN Spring Report for details), we expect a significant 
dampening of growth in 2007. In particular, private consumption which has 
been weak over the past years, will be negatively affected as CPI inflation will 
rise by 0.6 percentage points, restraining an improvement in the purchasing 
power of consumers that would otherwise have occurred as a result of a 
gradual pick up in wages. As the government has announced the tax increase 
already, we expect some frontloading of private consumption and residential 
investment from 2007 into 2006, raising the growth rate this year and 
depressing it next year. This effect accounts for approximately 0.4 per cent of 
the GDP growth difference between the years.  
 
In 2008, a reform in corporate income taxation is planned in order to foster 
business investment and includes a reduction of the tax rate on corporate 
profits from about 39 to about 30 per cent, (see Box 2.2 in Chapter 2, Section 
2). Many details are not yet clear and the reform is not embedded in the 
forecast. However, we do not expect a major impact on growth in 2008 mainly 
because, according to the current proposal, the reform will be implemented 
without worsening the budget as the tax base is planned to be broadened. 
FRANCE  
French GDP growth has accelerated in the first half of the year, growing by 
0.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2006 and by 1.1 per cent in the second 
quarter. However, domestic demand excluding stockbuilding grew by 0.6 per 
cent in the first and 0.8 per cent in the second quarters of the year. GDP 
figures for the first half of the year are more in line with survey data than they 
were in the last quarter of 2005 when GDP growth looked surprisingly weak at 
a mere 0.2 per cent.  
 
The industrial production index released for July points to a fall in industrial 
output that month (-1.3 per cent as compared to June), but 2.3 per cent growth 
                                                 
7 The figures refer to the growth rate adjusted for differences in the number of working days. It 
therefore differs from the unadjusted figures which are commonly used in Germany. 
Comparable unadjusted figures would be 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points higher this year and next, 
respectively and 0.3 percentage points lower in 2008. 
8There is a large number of other measures both on the expenditure and the revenue sides 
bringing the reduction in the structural deficit to an estimated 0.8 per cent. 
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for the last three months over the same period last year. The automobile 
industry is the major component dragging down the index (-6.9 per cent in a 
year). The lack of survey data makes it difficult to assess short-term 
developments in August but on the basis of survey data available up to July 
OFCE’s quarterly GDP growth indicator predicts a 0.6 per cent growth for the 
last two quarters of the year. This is in line with our forecast and would lead 
French GDP to grow at around 2.2 per cent in 2006, almost unchanged from 
our Spring forecast.  
 
We expect French GDP to grow at around 2 per cent in the next two years at a 
similar pace to the Euro Area average. French GDP growth will moderate 
because of decelerating export growth. In particular, the slowdown in German 
GDP growth will negatively affect French exports. French exporters have been 
losing market share in the last few years and although some stabilisation could 
take place, the prospects for exchange rates will not allow French exports to 
gain market shares outside of the Euro Area. Net external trade’s contribution 
to GDP growth is expected to remain negative.  
 
Government expenditure will rise less rapidly than GDP (by around 1.2 per 
cent each year) and private domestic demand will remain the main engine for 
growth. 
  
Inflation has remained subdued despite the rise in energy prices. The HICP 
rose by 2.1 per cent in August (compared to 2.4 per cent in the Euro Area) and 
we expect inflation to decelerate to 1.8 per cent in 2008. The combined effects 
of output growth and employment policies will help to bring the 
unemployment rate down from 9.5 per cent in 2005 to 8.8 per cent this year 
and to stabilise at 8.7 per cent over the forecast horizon.  
 
Fiscal policy will be contractionary this year. Fiscal plans for 2007 will be 
announced by the government at the end of September, but we expect that 
public spending growth will remain very moderate and that, even accounting 
for already announced personal income tax cuts ahead of an electoral year, the 
fiscal stance will be broadly neutral leaving the government deficit at around 
2.8 per cent of GDP. Fiscal policy is likely to be tightened in 2008, assuming 
the elections to be held next year will not bring major changes in terms of 
fiscal targets, and the deficit would come closer to 2.5 per cent of GDP. 
ITALY 
In the first half of 2006 GDP growth in Italy was above trend (1.6 per cent 
year-on-year), the highest since 2001, but still lower than the Euro Area 
average (2.4 per cent over the same period).  
 
The recovery was driven mainly by exports with business investment and 
household consumption also contributing positively to GDP growth. 
However, growth was spread over all GDP components, which points to a 
stable improvement in prospects with respect to the recent past. Strong growth 
is expected to be supported by an improvement in labour market conditions, 
even accounting for some measurement effect due to the regularisation of 
formerly illegal immigrants. In the first half of the year, employment rose by 1 
per cent on a year-on-year basis, mainly driven by developments in the services 
sector but with some improvement in the industry sector as well. The 
unemployment rate has fallen to 7.0 per cent, its lowest level in over 20 years.  
 
Overall HICP inflation was 2.3 per cent in August (as in the average of the first 
eight months) and is almost stable since the beginning of this year. So far, the 
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increase in energy prices has been affecting Italian prices less than those in 
other European countries.  
 
The latest information suggests that the recovery seems to be losing 
momentum, and that the peak of the cycle might be passed. Data on industrial 
production for July and survey measures, such as business confidence, imply 
that GDP growth may remain as strong in the third quarter as in the second 
quarter (0.5 per cent on a quarter-on-quarter basis) or slightly weaker, while the 
same data point towards a slowdown in the fourth quarter. The deceleration 
expected for the second half of this year is driven both by the slowing down in 
the international and European business cycles and by some fiscal tightening, 
following the first fiscal measures the new Government approved during the 
summer. Known as “Bersani Decree”, it mainly aims to foster market 
liberalisation in some sheltered markets and therefore to encourage price 
competition, but it also contains some consolidation measures that are 
expected to exert a positive influence on the fiscal balance. Under this 
scenario, our forecast is for GDP to grow by 1.6 per cent in 2006. Both net 
exports and domestic demand are expected to make a positive contribution to 
GDP growth. 
  
As far as 2007 is concerned, the two key variables in our assessment are the 
size of the international business cycle slowdown and, on the domestic side, 
the Budget Law that will be presented by the Government at the end of 
September, after the publication of this Report. We expect that the 
Government will be willing to reduce the fiscal deficit and debt in order to take 
advantage of the current economic recovery to consolidate fiscal balances. This 
will result in a restrictive fiscal policy for the next two years. 
 
Under this outlook, we forecast GDP growth to slow markedly in the first 
quarter before gradually picking up at the end of the year, with growth 
averaging 1.3 per cent for 2007 as a whole. On average, the growth expected 
for 2006-2008 (1.4 per cent) is in line with the long run trend growth of the 
Italian economy and it represents a significant recovery phase from the 
stagnation of the previous three years. This signals that some adjustment of the 
Italian manufacturing sector is under way but the available information 
precludes stating that potential growth has actually increased.9
 
As the improvement of the fiscal balance this year has been due to both 
cyclical and random factors, the budget plans for 2007 still remain quite 
ambitious. Even if the 2007 budget is implemented strictly, it may require 
more than one year to be completely effective. For these reasons, at this stage 
we forecast that the Italian fiscal balance will be below 3 per cent in two years.  
 
The large current account deficit in the US and the risk of a sudden adjustment 
remains one of the main risks to our forecast. In recent months some 
slowdown in the housing market in the US has been observed and in this 
section we consider the impact this potential adjustment mechanism would 
have on the US and also on the Euro Area. 
1.4 Risks from 
the US Housing 
Market  
1.4.1 US IMBALANCES AND THEIR CORRECTION THROUGH 
HOUSING MARKET ADJUSTMENT  
Over the last decade or so the US has moved into a significant net debtor 
position, as we can see from Figure 1.4.1, and by the end of 2005 its debts 
                                                 
9  See Annex Paper A7 for an analysis of some structural fragility in the Italian economy, 
available at http://www.euroframe.org/efn. 
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represented 20 per cent of its GDP, whilst its current account deficit was in 
excess of 6 per cent of GDP. Our forecast does not involve any major shift in 
the US deficit, and hence we project that the US net asset position will 
continue to deteriorate. A negative net asset position of this scale is not at all 
unusual, and of itself it is quite sustainable. However, it is clear from the figure 
that the current account would normally have been associated with a more 
rapidly rising debtor position but positive asset revaluation effects have clearly 
outweighed negative liability revaluations. We cannot assume that these 
revaluation effects will continue indefinitely unless the dollar continues to fall 
at a constant rate. If the dollar were to stabilise and if the US current account 
stays around minus 6 per cent of GDP the net asset position will settle at 
around minus 12010 per cent of GDP.11 It is not clear that this level of debt 
would be sustainable for such a large economy as the US, and hence we need 
to ask how a more sustainable trajectory might be reached. In this section we 
look at the impacts of a housing market correction in the US and its impacts 
on the current account.  
 
Figure 1.4.1: The US External Position 
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The US housing market has been strong in the last decade, and this is reflected 
both in the evolution of real house prices and of housing investment. Figure 
1.4.2 plots the ratio of housing investment (in real terms) to real GDP, which 
has recently been at its highest level for more than 20 years. This is of course 
in part because real long term interest rates have been lower than at any time 
over the last 20 years12, and our model equation indicates that this may have 
been a major factor behind high housing investment. If the strength of 
housing investment has been buoyed up by strong house prices, then a 
correction to the housing market could easily be associated with a return of 
housing investment to its historical proportion of GDP. Strong housing 
investment has increased demand in the US in the last 5 years, and if it were to 
                                                 
10 We would expect the relationship between the stock (S) and the flow (F) both as a proportion 
of nominal GDP (NY, growth ny) to be S(t) = F(t) – ny(t)*S(t-1), and hence the stock is in 
equilibrium when it equals the flow divided nominal growth rate, assuming no net revaluation 
effects. 
11 Of course the cumulating negative net interest payments position would mean that the trade 
balance would have to improve to offset it, and if the net rate of return on assets were 4 per cent 
per annum then a trade deficit of 1.2 per cent of GDP would be necessary. 
12 Our long real rate is based on actual (or from 1997 forecast and actual) inflation over the 
holding period, and not on indexed bond markets. These two measures tend to move together. 
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weaken it would be clear that growth would slow noticeably, and the current 
account would improve. 
 
Figure 1.4.2: Housing Investment and the Long Real Rate 
 
Low real interest rates may also have been a factor behind the evolution of real 
house prices in the last decade, although these may also have been associated 
with innovations in the mortgage market which have eased borrowing 
constraints. As we can see from Figure 1.4.3 real house prices haven rise by 
over 40 per cent over this period, and when compared to their longer term 
trend they may be overvalued by around 20 per cent.13
 
Figure 1.4.3: Real House Prices 
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We have undertaken three simulations on our model NiGEM, the first on a 
correction of the level of housing investment, the second on a fall in 20 per 
cent (as compared to base) in house prices, and the third combining the two.  
We also compare the house price simulation to an identical change using the 
                                                 
13 See L'aggiustamento del prezzo delle abitazioni negli USA: un esercizio con il modello 
internazionale. Prometeia, Rapporto di Previsione, Ottobre 2006. 
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Prometeia model, Priamo. In order to ensure comparability of the results we 
utilise both models in backward mode with fixed exchange rates, which 
necessitates a fourth NiGEM simulation. 
ADJUSTMENT THROUGH THE HOUSING MARKET  
A fall in housing investment large enough to quickly reduce the housing 
investment to GDP ratio back to its 1990s average would slow GDP markedly. 
We shock the intercept of the equation by enough to endogenously induce the 
fall in the ratio of housing investment to GDP plotted in Figure 1.4.4, and as 
we can see within 2 years the investment ratio is back at its 1990s level. 
 
Figure 1.4.4: Real Housing Investment as a share of Real GDP 
 
As a result of the fall in the ratio of housing investment to GDP growth would 
slow by 0.4 percentage points in the first year and by a further 0.2 in the 
second year and the structural current account will improve, as we can see in 
Figure 1.4.5 below. Our simulation is run with a policy feedback rule in place 
for interest rates and with rational expectations in financial markets and labour 
markets.  
Figure 1.4.5: The Impacts of a fall in Housing Investment on the US 
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As demand will slow, the Fed is expected to reduce interest rates, and markets 
will ‘jump’ in anticipation. The nominal exchange rate falls by 0.8 percentage 
points immediately, and the long term interest rate will fall by 0.33 percentage 
points. In the medium term the long term real interest rate also falls by around 
0.25 percentage points in the simulation, as housing investment is permanently 
lower. This raises business investment and helps push output back to baseline. 
 
Housing market adjustment is likely to also come through lower house prices 
and we have simulated the potential impacts by reducing them by 20 per cent 
as compared to our baseline over 2 years, and leaving them permanently lower 
than they would have been. House prices feed into housing wealth, and this in 
turn affects the level of consumption14, which falls relative to baseline by more 
than 3 per cent in two years. GDP growth slows sharply and output is almost 
1.5 per cent lower than it would have been after two years. As demand will 
slow, the Fed is expected to reduce interest rates, and markets will ‘jump’ in 
anticipation, as a result the effective exchange rate falls by two per cent. This 
raises inflationary pressure, and in the very short run the Fed may raise rates to 
combat this. However, the lower level of demand means that interest rates are 
lower in the future and hence long term interest rates fall, and real long term 
rates fall by 0.7 percentage points. The reduction in domestic demand 
improves the current account permanently by about 0.7 per cent of GDP, and 
the impact of the lower real exchange rate on net exports along with the effects 
of lower long interest rates on investment help push output back toward 
baseline. 
 
Figure 1.4.6: The Impacts of a 20 Per Cent Fall in US House Prices 
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If we were to run our model in backward mode, with a fixed exchange rate 
some of the effects we observe would be different, and in particular the 
stabilising feedbacks from lower long term interest rates and the exchange rate 
would be absent. This would also allow us to compare our results to those of 
the Prometeia international model, Priamo, and we do this in Table 1.4.  
 
                                                 
14 The role of housing wealth in consumption is discussed in Barrell, R., and Davis, E.P., (2006) 
and in Al Eyd, A. Barrell, R, Davis, E.P., and Pomerantz, O., (2005). Housing  wealth effects on 
the model are large and rapidly acting in the US, and are probably 5 times larger than the impacts 
of financial wealth. 
  
   OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA 25 
 
The impacts on consumption in NiGEM in backward and forward mode are 
virtually the same, and somewhat higher than in Priamo, as we can see, whilst 
the GDP effects are higher in backward than in forward mode in NiGEM. The 
shock absorbers that come from the jumps in real exchange rate, long term 
real interest rates, equity prices and wealth all together reduce the impacts on 
output in the US by up to 0.5 percentage points in three years. The impacts on 
US GDP are larger in NiGEM than in Priamo in the same mode of operation, 
with US imports falling more in the latter model, which helps explain why the 
impacts on the Euro Area in Priamo are larger, as more of the shock is 
exported. In NiGEM the impacts on the Euro Area are especially small in the 
first year. Forward looking model runs give smaller effects after 3 years with 
lower real interest rates more than offsetting the impacts of the appreciation in 
the forward mode run. If we import NiGEM interest rates and exchange rates 
into Priamo then Euro Area output still fall more than in NiGEM initially, but 
it returns to base after 4 years.  
 
The effects of the shock on the current balance depend in part on the 
revaluation effects on net assets and IPD flows. In the forward looking 
NiGEM simulation the US effective exchange rate falls by almost 3 per cent, 
and the IPD balance improves as a result. The effects of the fall in demand in 
the US on Euro Area output are larger in Priamo, and they suggest we need to 
be more cautious about events there than the NiGEM model would indicate.  
 
Table 1.4:  Impacts of a 20 Per Cent Change in US House Prices 
NiGEM forward mode 
 
US 
Consumption US GDP 
US Current 
Balance 
Euro Area 
GDP 
2006 -0.65 -0.22 0.01 -0.05 
2007 -2.43 -1.00 0.43 -0.21 
2008 -3.37 -1.41 0.64 -0.28 
2009 -2.93 -1.06 0.62 -0.24 
All except CBR % diff from base, CBR % points of GDP diff from base 
     
NiGEM backward mode 
 
US 
Consumption US GDP 
US Current 
Balance 
Euro Area 
GDP 
2006 -0.66 -0.41 0.13 -0.05 
2007 -2.41 -1.47 0.40 -0.22 
2008 -3.36 -1.93 0.43 -0.41 
2009 -2.94 -1.48 0.33 -0.56 
All except CBR % diff from base, CBR % points of GDP diff from base 
     
Priamo 
 
US 
Consumption US GDP 
US Current 
Balance 
Euro Area 
GDP 
2006 -0.93 -0.66 0.17 -0.17 
2007 -1.58 -1.17 0.26 -0.36 
2008 -1.72 -1.30 0.21 -0.49 
2009 -1.59 -1.20 0.19 -0.56 
All except CBR % diff from base, CBR % points of GDP diff from base 
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ADDING THE SHOCKS TOGETHER 
We can add the NiGEM house price fall and the NiGEM decline in housing 
investment scenarios together in a third scenario and look at the impacts of a 
housing market slowdown in the US, and we do this in Figure 1.4.7. US output 
growth would slow by 0.6 per cent in the first year and by 1.0 per cent in the 
second, and the US current account would improve by almost 1 per cent of 
GDP, with the effects coming through quite quickly.  
 
Euro Area output growth would slow by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points a year for 
2 to 3 years, but output would then recover. About a third of the short term 
improvement in the current account comes from revaluation effects on IPD 
flows, and the trade balance improves by about 0.6 per cent of GDP. The 
significantly higher level of US saving in this simulation is associated with 
lower long term interest rates, and Euro Area rates follow those in the US 
because there are few barriers to the mobility of capital in the model. As a 
result, in the longer term Euro Area output is marginally higher than it would 
otherwise have been. In the short term the euro appreciates by 4 per cent 
against all currencies and by around 6.5 per cent against the US dollar, and as a 
result Euro Area inflation falls by 0.3 to 0.4 per cent a year for 3 years. 
 
Figure 1.4.7: The Impacts of a Slowdown in the US Housing Market 
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CONCLUSION 
The US may need to adjust its current account by as much as 3 per cent of 
GDP in order that its net asset position remains above minus 60 per cent of 
GDP, and a more major adjustment of the housing market may be needed to 
effectuate this, or consumption may need to fall further.15 If we scale up our 
shocks to achieve a 3 per cent of GDP improvement, then we would suspect 
US growth would slow by almost 2 per cent a year for 3 years, and the Euro 
                                                 
15 Adjustment through fiscal consolidation is also a possibility. A 1 per cent of GDP reduction 
in the government deficit in the US improves the current account by 0.5 per cent of GDP 
permanently if we use the same assumptions as in this section. However, if we assume 
consumers are forward looking and include changes in future tax liabilities in their consumption 
decision, then a fiscal consolidation in the model has no sustained impact on the current 
account, as Barrell and Holland (2006) discuss.  
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Area would experience slower growth of about a quarter of a per cent a year 
for the same period.  
 
There are of course other ways for the US current account to adjust. Barrell 
and Holland (2006) discuss a change in the risk premium on US assets induced 
by a realisation that the scale of debt will in the future rise more than had been 
anticipated, and they suggest that a 30 per cent fall in the US dollar effective 
exchange rate would be needed to induce a 3 per cent of GDP correction in 
the current account by this route alone. Some of the improvement in the net 
asset position would come from revaluations of assets, given that many US 
assets are denominated in dollars. For instance in NiGEM a 5 per cent fall in 
the dollar effective rate is associated with a 5 per cent of GDP improvement in 
the net asset ratio. Gourinches and Rey (2005) and Al Eyd, Barrell, and 
Pomerantz (2005) suggest that up to 30 per cent of international adjustment of 
the current account and asset position for the dollar comes from these 
revaluation effects, and this is consistent with our results.  
 
Adjustment would be slower through a risk premium related route, and if the 
US current account were to improve by 3 per cent of GDP US output growth 
would have to slow by 0.9 percentage points a year for 5 years (a cumulated 4.5 
per cent fall) to accommodate a 3 per cent permanent improvement in the US 
current account. Although Euro Area real interest rates would fall in a ‘risk 
premium induced’ realignment, the euro would appreciate against the dollar by 
almost 40 per cent. The initial loss of competitiveness would be a major factor 
behind a sustained slowdown in growth of up to 0.3 percentage points a year 
for 3 years, and interest rates might become liquidity trapped. Whichever of 
these two adjustment mechanisms operates, growth will have to slow sharply 
in the US, and by a noticeable amount in the Euro Area. 
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FORECAST TABLES 
 
 
     Annex Table 1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Areaa 
 a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Output Growth Rate 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.0 
Inflation Rate 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.0 
Unemployment Rate 8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.6 7.5 
Gov. Balance as % GDP -2.6 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.4 
 
 
 
Annex Table 2: Real GDP in Major Economies 
 World OECD NAFTA China 
EU-
25 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1996-
2002 3.6 2.7 3.3 8.6 2.5 2.4 3.3 0.8 1.6 2.3 1.7 2.9 
2003 4.1 2.0 2.4 10.0 1.3 0.8 2.5 1.8 -0.2 1.1 0.1 2.7 
2004 5.3 3.3 3.9 10.1 2.2 1.7 3.9 2.3 0.8 2.0 0.9 3.3 
2005 4.8 2.8 3.2 9.9 1.8 1.5 3.2 2.6 1.1 1.2 0.1 1.9 
2006 5.2 3.1 3.5 10.4 2.8 2.6 3.4 2.6 2.4 2.2 1.6 2.7 
2007 4.7 2.6 2.6 9.5 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.4 2.0 1.3 2.7 
2008 4.6 2.6 2.6 8.8 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.6 2.0 1.3 2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
     Annex Table 3: Private Consumption Deflator in Major Economies 
 OECD NAFTA China EU 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1996-
2002 2.1 2.5 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.8 -0.4 1.0 1.1 2.7 2.2 
2003 1.8 2.2 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 -1.0 1.6 1.7 2.8 1.9 
2004 2.1 2.7 3.9 1.9 2.0 2.6 -0.6 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.7 
2005 2.1 2.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.9 -0.8 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.5 
2006 2.4 3.1 1.7 2.3 2.3 3.2 -0.1 1.8 1.7 2.6 2.5 
2007 2.5 3.1 3.0 2.4 2.3 3.2 0.1 2.5 1.8 2.4 2.5 
2008 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.6 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.5 
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Annex Table 4:  World Trade Volume and Prices 
 World trade volume
World export prices 
in $ 
Oil price ($ per 
barrel)a
 Annual percentage changes 
1996-2002 6.5 -2.8 20.4 
2003 5.1 9.0 27.8 
2004 9.9 8.0 35.9 
2005 7.0 3.8 51.8 
2006 8.8 2.8 66.8 
2007 6.4 3.7 67.6 
2008 6.6 2.2 67.9 
a Based on the unweighted average of the Brent, WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Dubai oil 
prices. 
 
 
Annex Table 5: Interest Rates 
 
 Short-term interest rates  Long-term interest rates  
 USA Japan 
Euro 
Area UK USA Japan Euro Area UK 
2003 1.2 0.0 2.3 3.7 4.0 1.1 4.1 4.5 
2004 1.6 0.0 2.1 4.6 4.3 1.5 4.1 4.9 
2005 3.5 0.0 2.2 4.7 4.3 1.3 3.4 4.4 
2006 5.1 0.2 3.1 4.8 4.9 1.9 3.9 4.5 
2007 5.1 0.7 3.6 5.2 5.0 2.1 4.1 4.7 
2008 4.7 1.1 3.6 5.0 4.8 2.2 4.1 4.8 
         
2006Q1 4.7 0.1 2.6 4.5 4.6 1.7 3.5 4.2 
2006Q2 5.2 0.1 2.9 4.6 5.1 1.9 4.1 4.6 
2006Q3 5.3 0.3 3.2 4.8 5.0 1.9 4.1 4.6 
2006Q4 5.3 0.4 3.5 5.1 5.0 1.9 4.1 4.7 
         
2007Q1 5.3 0.6 3.5 5.2 5.0 2.0 4.1 4.7 
2007Q2 5.2 0.7 3.6 5.3 5.0 2.0 4.1 4.7 
2007Q3 5.0 0.8 3.6 5.2 5.0 2.1 4.1 4.8 
2007Q4 4.9 0.8 3.6 5.1 4.9 2.1 4.1 4.8 
         
2008Q1 4.8 1.0 3.6 5.1 4.8 2.2 4.1 4.8 
2008Q2 4.7 1.0 3.6 5.0 4.8 2.2 4.1 4.8 
2008Q3 4.6 1.1 3.6 5.0 4.8 2.2 4.1 4.8 
2008Q4 4.6 1.2 3.6 5.0 4.7 2.3 4.1 4.8 
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Annex Table 6: Effective Exchange Rates 
 USA Japan Euro Area Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2003 -6.1 4.2 13.8 6.6 6.4 7.1 -2.7 
2004 -4.4 3.7 5.5 2.3 2.3 2.7 5.3 
2005 -2.7 -3.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -1.5 
2006 -1.1 -4.9 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 
2007 -1.3 1.5 2.9 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.2 
2008 -0.1 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 -0.5 
        
2006Q1 -1.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.7 
2006Q2 -1.5 1.5 3.2 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.5 
2006Q3 -0.4 -1.2 1.7 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.9 
2006Q4 -0.5 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 
        
2007Q1 -0.2 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 -0.4 
2007Q2 -0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
2007Q3 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 
2007Q4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
        
2008Q1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 
2008Q2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
2008Q3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2 
2008Q4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
 
 
 
Annex Table 7: Euro Area, Main Features of Forecasta
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Annual percentage changes 
Volumes  
Consumption 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.8 1.6 2.0 
Private investment -3.5 2.1 3.3 3.2 4.7 4.3 2.9 
Government expenditure 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.3 1.4 1.5 
Stockbuildingb -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Total domestic demand 0.1 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.6 2.0 2.1 
Export volumes 1.7 1.1 6.3 4.5 8.3 4.8 5.4 
Import volumes 0.3 3.1 6.2 5.5 8.1 4.8 5.6 
GDP 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.0 
Average earnings 4.0 2.9 2.2 2.0 2.7 3.4 3.2 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.0 
Private consumption deflator 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.1 
Real personal disposable income 1.5 0.9 1.4 0.8 1.1 2.0 1.9 
 Levels 
Standardised unemployment %  8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.6 7.5 
Government financial balancec -2.6 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.4 
Government debtc 68.1 69.3 69.8 70.8 68.9 67.5 65.9 
Current accountc 0.7 0.4 0.6 -0.3 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 
a See footnote a of Annex table 1. 
b Change as percentage of GDP.  
 
cAs a percentage of GDP.  
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Annex Table 8: Real GDP in the European Uniona
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.2 2.7 2.1 3.0 2.1 2.0 
Belgium 0.9 2.4 1.5 2.7 2.5 2.6 
Denmark 0.7 1.9 3.2 3.1 2.4 2.6 
Finland 1.9 3.3 3.0 4.9 2.6 2.6 
France 1.1 2.0 1.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 
Germany -0.2 0.8 1.1 2.4 1.4 1.6 
Greece 4.8 4.7 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.1 
Ireland 4.3 4.3 5.5 5.8 5.0 5.0 
Italy 0.1 0.9 0.1 1.6 1.3 1.3 
Netherlands 0.3 2.0 1.5 3.2 3.1 2.1 
Portugal -1.1 1.2 0.4 1.3 1.5 2.2 
Spain 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.9 
Sweden 1.8 3.3 2.7 4.4 3.0 3.1 
United Kingdom 2.7 3.3 1.9 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Poland 3.8 5.3 3.4 5.2 4.8 4.5 
Hungary 3.4 4.8 4.4 4.4 3.1 3.1 
Czech Republic 3.6 4.2 6.1 6.7 5.0 5.2 
Estonia 6.7 7.8 9.8 9.5 7.7 6.3 
Latvia 7.2 8.5 10.4 10.0 6.9 6.8 
Lithuania 10.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 7.8 6.6 
Slovak Republic 4.2 5.4 6.1 6.2 6.5 5.4 
Slovenia 2.4 3.7 4.2 4.7 3.7 3.3 
       
Euro Area 0.8 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.0 
EU-15 1.1 2.0 1.6 2.6 2.1 2.2 
NMS-10 4.1 5.1 4.7 5.8 5.0 4.6 
EU-25 1.3 2.2 1.8 2.8 2.3 2.3 
a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
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Annex Table 9: Harmonised Inflation in the European Union 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.3 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.8 
Belgium 1.5 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 
Denmark 2.0 0.9 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.2 
Finland 1.3 0.1 0.8 1.8 1.6 1.6 
France 2.2 2.3 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.8 
Germany 1.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.6 2.0 
Greece 3.4 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.9 
Ireland 4.0 2.3 2.2 3.5 3.8 2.9 
Italy 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.0 
Netherlands 2.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.5 
Portugal 3.3 2.5 2.1 2.7 2.3 2.2 
Spain 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.7 2.9 2.6 
Sweden 2.3 1.0 0.8 1.8 2.1 1.7 
United Kingdom 1.4 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.1 
Poland 0.7 3.6 2.2 1.3 2.1 2.5 
Hungary 4.7 6.8 3.5 3.3 4.6 3.7 
Czech Republic -0.1 2.6 1.6 2.6 3.0 2.8 
Estonia 1.4 3.0 4.1 4.6 5.0 3.3 
Latvia 2.9 6.2 6.9 6.4 4.5 3.0 
Lithuania -1.1 1.2 2.7 3.3 3.2 2.5 
Slovakia 8.5 7.4 2.8 4.5 3.4 2.8 
Slovenia 5.7 3.7 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.7 
       
Euro Area 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.0 
EU-15 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.0 
NMS-10 1.8 4.1 2.5 2.4 2.9 2.8 
EU-25 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.1 
 
 
Annex Table 10: Fiscal Balances in the EU-15a 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 % GDP 
Austria -1.7 -1.2 -1.6 -1.6 -1.2 -0.9 
Belgium 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
Denmark -0.1 1.7 3.9 3.1 3.1 2.1 
Finland 2.3 1.9 2.4 3.0 2.8 3.2 
France -4.2 -3.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.4 
Germany -4.0 -3.7 -3.3 -2.4 -1.6 -1.4 
Greece -5.8 -6.8 -4.4 -2.9 -3.1 -3.1 
Ireland 0.2 1.6 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Italy -3.5 -3.5 -4.1 -3.8 -3.3 -2.9 
Netherlands -3.2 -2.1 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Portugal -3.0 -3.2 -6.0 -4.4 -3.7 -3.1 
Spain 0.0 -0.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 
Sweden -0.2 1.6 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.3 
United Kingdom -3.3 -3.3 -3.1 -2.9 -2.6 -2.5 
 
Euro Area -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.4 
Eu-15 -2.9 -2.6 -2.2 -1.9 -1.6 -1.4 
a We do not show fiscal balances for the NMS as the introduction of pension reforms distorts 
figures. 
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Annex Table 11: Standardised Unemployment Rate in the European Union 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 % Total labour force 
Austria 4.3 4.9 5.2 4.9 4.9 5.0 
Belgium 8.2 8.4 8.4 8.6 8.3 8.1 
Denmark 5.4 5.5 4.8 3.9 3.5 3.5 
Finland 9.0 8.9 8.4 7.7 7.4 7.3 
France 9.4 9.6 9.5 8.8 8.7 8.7 
Germany 9.1 9.5 9.5 8.3 8.2 8.2 
Greece 9.7 10.5 9.9 9.3 9.0 8.4 
Ireland 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.3 
Italy 8.4 8.0 7.7 7.2 7.4 7.4 
Netherlands 3.7 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.1 
Portugal 6.3 6.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.5 
Spain 11.1 10.7 9.2 8.1 7.5 6.9 
Sweden 5.6 6.3 6.7 6.2 5.8 5.3 
United Kingdom 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.5 5.7 5.8 
Poland 19.6 19.0 17.8 16.1 15.0 14.7 
Hungary 5.9 6.1 7.2 7.4 8.0 7.5 
Czech Republic 7.8 8.3 7.9 7.3 6.6 5.8 
Estonia 10.0 9.7 7.9 4.8 4.1 3.7 
Latvia 10.5 10.4 8.9 7.6 7.6 7.7 
Lithuania 12.5 11.4 8.2 5.6 5.4 5.3 
Slovakia 17.6 18.2 16.2 14.2 14.1 14.1 
Slovenia 6.7 6.3 6.5 6.4 6.0 5.5 
Euro Area 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.6 7.5 
EU-15 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.3 7.2 7.1 
NMS-10 14.7 14.5 13.5 12.3 11.5 11.2 
EU-25 9.0 9.0 8.8 8.0 7.8 7.7 
 
 
  
 
2. EUROPEAN POLICY 
MONITORING 
Monetary conditions in the Euro Area have deteriorated in recent months. 
The ECB’s key interest rate (the minimum bid rate in the Eurosystem’s main 
refinancing operations) was raised again in August and stands at 3 per cent. 
Money market rates (3-month EURIBOR) are also higher than in the spring of 
this year; by mid-September, the rate went up to 3.30 per cent. Apparently, 
further rate hikes by the ECB are currently expected by the market. In the past 
six months, the real short-term interest rate rose by roughly half a percentage 
point as the inflation rate, especially core inflation, has changed only 
marginally; however, the real rate is still below its long-term average. Bond 
yields have risen until the summer but dropped again recently. In mid-
September, the yield for 10-year government bonds recently amounted to 
about 3.8 per cent which is about the same level as six months ago. In real 
terms, long-term rates are also below their long-term average independent of 
the inflation measure used (the core rate of inflation or inflationary 
expectations, approximated by the ten-year break-even inflation rate for 
bonds). The euro has appreciated against major world currencies, in particular 
vis-à-vis the Japanese yen, but also against the US-dollar. In real and effective 
terms (EER-42, CPI basis), the appreciation amounted about 3 per cent during 
the past six months. Therefore, the competitiveness of exporters in the Euro 
Area has deteriorated somewhat in this period.  
2.1 
Monetary Policy 
in the Euro Area 
 
The ECB also looks at the expansion of money and credit when analysing 
monetary conditions. Monetary aggregates continued to show strong growth. 
M3 growth has been persistently above 8 per cent during most of the year. 
Growth of the narrow aggregate M1 decelerated a little bit in recent months. 
Credits to the private sector increased by more than 10 per cent in the wake of 
the strong upswing in the Euro Area. All these developments have confirmed 
the judgement of the central bank that interest rates had to be raised. 
 
The monetary conditions index (MCI) used here, which weights together short 
real rates, long rates and the real exchange rate, underlines the fact that the 
Euro Area economy gets less of an impulse from interest rates and the 
exchange rate (Figure 2.1.1). The index has deteriorated somewhat since the 
beginning of this year, after a period of about two years with improving 
conditions. In comparison, monetary conditions in the US have been 
deteriorating since the beginning of 2005 when the Fed started to raise the 
target for the Federal Funds rate. However, the movement is not so large as 
the strong increase of the key interest rate would suggest because inflation has 
accelerated quite strongly and long-term rates which are also included in the 
MCI presented here did not increase very much. 
 
The ECB has indicated quite clearly that it will continue to raise key rates in 
the near future. Apart from the monetary analysis which shows strong growth 
of money and credit aggregates, the fact that inflation has persistently been 
above the target is a matter of concern for the ECB, even if the current 
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deviation can be explained by the surge of energy prices earlier this year. In 
addition, the forecasts for real GDP growth as well as for inflation have been 
continuously revised upwards in the course of this year. This is not only true 
for the Professional Forecasters but also for the ECB staff macroeconomic 
projections. While the mean for real GDP growth in 2006 was 1.9 per cent in 
December 2005, the recent figure reported in the September Monthly Bulletin 
is 2.5 per cent. As far as inflation in the current year is concerned, the rate for 
the HCIP went up from 2.1 per cent in December 2005 to 2.4 per cent in 
September 2006. In this respect and with the benefit of hindsight, the starting 
point of monetary tightening in December last year was not too early. 
 
What is important for the assessment of future interest rate moves of the ECB 
is the outlook for 2007. Here, too, there have been upward revisions for both 
real GDP growth and the inflation rate. The mean of the projections for HICP 
inflation now stands at 2.4 per cent, so that inflation is expected to remain 
above the ECB’s target for the eighth year in a row.  
 
The high forecast for inflation is even more remarkable given that the ECB 
staff projection is run under the assumption that the three-month money 
market rate EURIBOR will be 3.9 per cent on average in 2007 which already 
implies a substantial tightening of monetary policy. In June this year, the ECB 
changed its procedure in terms of the projections. While it was assumed earlier 
that short-term interest rates would remain constant during the forecasting 
horizon, it is now assumed that rates move according to market expectations. 
Thus, the ECB followed the common practice of other central banks (e.g. the 
Bank of England or the Swedish Riksbank) in this respect. It also got rid of the 
often criticized inconsistency because for other variables (oil prices, long-term 
interest rates etc.) it had been assumed that they would change according to 
market forecasts. However, this change in the procedure has implications for 
the transparency of the central bank and is also a challenge for the 
communication policy. For example, if the inflation rate is above the target 
although interest rates go up (as it is the case for 2007), the ECB implicitly 
states that the assumed increase of interest rates is not sufficient for reaching 
the target. Therefore, one could conclude that the ECB intends to raise interest 
rates by more. While this conclusion does not follow “automatically”, it would 
be necessary to explain a possible discrepancy to the public. For example, the 
ECB would have to make clear that transitory effects such as the increase of 
energy prices is responsible for the high inflation rate or in this case that part 
of the increase can be explained by a one-time effect like the VAT increase in 
Germany next year.  
 
Our forecast for the ECB’s policy in the near term is that key interest rates will 
be raised gradually to reach 3.5 per cent at the beginning of next year. This is 
roughly in line with market expectations. At this level, interest rates will be 
close to the neutral rate according to many estimates. The course of further 
tightening can also be derived from a forward looking Taylor rule (Box 2.1). 
This empirical reaction function can explain the ECB’s behavior in the past 
quite well. However, it is not useful for longer-term horizons because the 
confidence bands become very wide. 
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Figure 2.1.1: Monetary Conditions for the Euro Area and the US 
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Box 2.1: An Empirical Taylor Rule for the Euro Area Based on Real 
Time Data, IfW Kiel 
 
The Taylor rule is one of the most frequently used methods to analyze 
monetary policy. It states that a central bank should raise interest rate i above 
the neutral rate
∗i if inflationπ exceeds the inflation target ∗π or alternatively if 
the output gap is positive, i.e. when real GDP y exceeds potential output
∗y . 
The Taylor interest rate is then determined by 
 
(1) ( ) ( )∗∗∗ −⋅+−⋅+= tttttTt yyii 21 βππβ , 
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where 1β  and 2β  are the weights of both arguments. Often each of the 
weights is set equal to 0.5 following Taylor (1993). Since monetary unification 
in Europe started in 1999, there are now enough observations available to 
estimate those weights which can describe monetary policy of the ECB. The 
Taylor rule then can be also used to forecast monetary policy. 
 
One main issue estimating 1β  and 2β  is that the neutral interest rate and 
potential output are not observable but have to be estimated. Growth theory 
suggests there is a direct relationship between potential output growth and the 
neutral rate. The real neutral interest rate ttt πir −=
∗∗
 should be strongly 
correlated with the growth rate of potential output 
***
1−−= tyyy tt)  or even be 
identical. Augmenting (1) by tπ  as well as 
∗
tπ and substituting ( )tt πi −∗  by ∗ty)  
leads to: 
 
(2) ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗ −⋅+−⋅++= ttttttTt yyβππδπyi 21) , 
 
with 11 1 βδ += . Taking into account that central banks usually adjust interest 
rates only gradually to changes in output and inflation – Giannoni and 
Woodford (2005) provide theoretical reasons for this behavior of interest rate 
smoothing – and allowing a parameter value different from 1 for potential 
output growth, equation (2) can be modified to: 
 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∗∗∗∗− −⋅+−⋅++⋅⋅−+⋅= tttttttt yyβππδπyγαiαi 211 1 ) , 
 
whereα represents the degree of interest rate stickiness, or – in other words – 
the degree of interest rate smoothing. Since the neutral rate was substituted, 
potential output remains as the only unobservable variable in (3). 
 
One basic alternative for estimating potential output is to make use of 
univariate mechanical filter methods such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
However, filter methods are well known to suffer in general from instability at 
the end of samples, which are naturally of special interest for policy makers. 
The instability arises because these methods calculate the trend as two-sided 
weighted averages of the underlying times series. In the case of potential 
output, the instability can be reduced by using forecasts for real GDP. If there 
is perfect foresight and no need of data revision occurs, the problem of 
instability vanishes completely. Estimating potential output for the Euro Area 
with the HP filter reveals that there is a substantial estimation uncertainty. 
 
Neglecting problems of data revision, the size of methodological uncertaintya, 
using the HP filter for potential output estimates can be quantified by 
comparing standard estimates with the recursive ones.b Figure 2.1.2 shows 
estimation results of potential output for the Euro Area since 1999 using both 
methods. Recursive estimates need to be revised significantly, up to 1.5 per 
cent, if further data become available. Simulating the situation of a central bank 
policy maker it is sensible to make use of the recursive estimation results for 
calculating the weights 1δ  and 2β  of equation (3). 
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To obtain more realistic estimation results one should take also into account 
the fact that central banks try to stabilize future inflation, since actual inflation 
is already fixed. Usually the scope of central banks should be one to two years. 
Here it is assumed that the ECB targets the expected inflation [ ]πtE  for the 
next year. The Survey of Professional Forecasters provide quarterly real-time 
data for these expectations since 1999.c Figure 2.1.3 indicates that since 2000 
the expectations are almost permanently below actual inflation. One reason for 
the systematic forecast error is obviously the strong increase of oil prices 
during this period.   
 
Estimation of equation (3) for the three-month money market rate gives the 
following results:    
 
Table 2.2.1 Estimated parameters of equation (3) 
Parameter α γ  δ1 β2 
Estimated value 
(t-value) 
0.65 
(10.41) 
0.88 
(24.91) 
2.81 
(4.05) 
0.96 
(4.11) 
 
Tests show that the residuals are free of autocorrelation and based on the 
lagged interest rate term R2 is high with a value of 0.95. The coefficient γ  is 
significantly lower than 1. 
 
According to the estimation results, the three-month money market rate 
should increase to 4.3 per cent until early 2007. Thus the ECB would probably 
increase the minimum bid rate in the main refinancing operations to 4.0 per 
cent. But we expect the ECB to disregard the inflation effect of the increase of 
the VAT in Germany. If the inflation forecast for 2007 is lowered by 0.2 
percentage points, the expected level of the three-month money market rate 
becomes 3.7 per cent. This is compatible with a key interest rate of 3.5 per 
cent. 
 
  Figure 2.1.2: Output Gap in the Euro Area 
1998–2006a
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a Estimated with a Hodrick–Prescott filter.  
Source: own calculations. 
Figure 2.1.3: Inflation in the Euro Area 1998–
2006a 
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a Forecast for the following calendar year,  
shifted forward for two months .  
 
Source: ECB. 
 
a Clausen und Meier (2005) show that the methodological uncertainty is by far 
more important for the estimation uncertainty of potential output than of data 
  
 
40 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
revisions. Orphanides and van Norden (2002) obtained the same result for US 
data. — b Recursive estimates make use only of the available data for every 
single data point, including forecasts, but excluding data which would be not 
available for a policy maker at that point of time. The estimated times series of 
potential output then contains of single estimates for every data point. — c 
These data are available at the webpage of the ECB.  
 
The outlook for public finances has improved more rapidly than we 
anticipated in the Euro Area over the last few months. This results both from 
stronger than expected GDP growth and in most countries and from larger 
than expected improvement in non cyclical balances mainly in Germany and 
Italy. We expect the fiscal stance to remain slightly contractionary at the Euro 
Area level up to 2008, however with substantial differences among member 
states. In particular, we expect fiscal policy to be significantly restrictive in 
Germany and in Italy. 
2.2 Fiscal Policy 
in the Euro Area 
GROWTH PROSPECTS1   
                                                
We expect Euro Area GDP to grow by 2.6 per cent this year and around 2.0 
per cent in 2007 and 2008. GDP growth prospects have been revised upwards 
since our March forecasts (+0.4 percentage point up from 2 per cent for the 
area) in almost all Euro Area countries, generally by around 0.5 percentage 
point, except for France (unchanged at around 2.2 per cent).  
 
2006 will be the first in the last six years that Euro Area GDP turns out to rise 
more rapidly in the current year than expected in the latest updates of the 
Stability Programmes (SP’s). Last time this occurred was in late 2000, when the 
strength of growth in Europe was underestimated at 3.3 per cent instead of 3.9 
per cent that actually turned out (see Table 2.2.1). 
 
However we do not expect the recovery to be as large and long lasting as in 
the end of the 1990’s. Our forecast for Euro Area GDP growth is indeed 
almost unchanged for 2007 (2 per cent) and points to similar numbers for 
2008. For the two coming years, our GDP forecasts are indeed currently very 
similar with the latest updates of the SPs.  
 
1 It should be noted that EUROFRAME-EFN figures are working-day adjusted. This implies in 
terms of German GDP growth, that they are all other things being equal 0.2 percentage higher 
this year and 0.1 higher next year than unadjusted annual figures which are forecast by the 
German government for instance. 
  
   EUROPEAN POLICY MONITORING 41 
 
Table 2.2.1 Euro Area GDP growth and general government balances 
according to the stability programmes 
 GDP growth assumptions (per cent) General government balance (per cent of GDP) 
 Stability Programmes Actual Stability Programmes Actual
 J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06  J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06 
98 2.8        2.7 -2.1 -1.9       -2.3 
99 2.5 2.2       2.9 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2      -1.3 
00 2.6 2.8 3.3      4.0 -1.5 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8     -1.0 
01 2.6 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.5    1.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -1.2 -1.6    -1.8 
02  2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0    1.0  -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -2.2    -2.6 
03  2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 0.6   0.7  -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.7   -3.1 
04   2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.0  1.8   0.4 0.1 -1.1 -2.4 -2.7  -2.8 
05    2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.4 1.4    0.3 -0.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.6 -2.4 
06     2.6 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.61     -0.2 -1.3 -1.8 -2.4 -2.01
07      2.5 2.4 2.0 1.91      -0.9 -1.3 -1.9 -1.61
08       2.4 2.2 2.01       -1.0 -1.4 -1.41
09        2.2 –        -0.9 – 
1. EUROFRAME-EFN, Autumn 2006 Forecast. 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN, Stability programmes, Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
GOVERNMENT BALANCES 
We expect the Euro Area government deficit to stand at around 2.0 per cent of 
GDP this year down from 2.4 per cent in 2005 and to decrease further at 
around 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2007 before stabilising at that level in 2008. 
These prospects show a more rapid improvement in 2006 than announced in 
the SP’s, where the Euro Area deficit was expected to decrease from 2.6 per 
cent in 2005 to 2.4 per cent in 2006.  
 
Government balance targets announced in the SP’s will be met in almost all 
Euro Area countries this year, except in Italy where we expect a deficit of 3.8 
per cent of GDP, slightly above the SP’s target (3.5 per cent), and in Greece 
(2.9 per cent instead of 2.6 per cent).  
 
However, in countries running deficits, deficits will be lower than we forecast 
six months ago partly because of higher growth, partly because of stronger 
fiscal tightening, and partly because tax revenues have been stronger than we 
would have anticipated given other factors.  
 
The strongest improvements in terms of deficits are in Germany and Italy. We 
now expect the German deficit to fall significantly below 3 per cent this year, 
reaching 2.4 per cent of GDP instead of 2.9 per cent forecast six months ago 
(and 3.3 per cent in the latest update of the German SP). This is due partly to 
higher GDP growth (2.4 per cent instead of 2.2 per cent forecast six months 
ago) which has allowed for higher tax receipts and lower expenditures 
(especially unemployment allowances) and mainly to an improvement in the 
non cyclical balance. The later is stemming in part from earlier measures on the 
revenue side that have raised tax revenues more than expected and from lower 
expenditures on active labour market. 
 
In Italy, higher than expected growth (1.6 per cent instead of 1.0 per cent 
forecast six months ago), will help to reduce the deficit more rapidly than we 
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expected (3.8 per cent2 instead of 4.8 per cent in our forecast six months ago), 
together also with some improvement in the non cyclical balance.  
 
We also expect higher GDP to help reduce the deficits in Portugal and Greece, 
with GDP expected to grow by 1.7 per cent this year in Portugal (1.3 per cent 
forecast last March) and by 3.7 (instead of 3.2 per cent) in Greece. This is likely 
to allow the Greek deficit to fall slightly below 3 per cent this year.  
 
We expect fiscal deficits to be reduced further in 2007 and 2008 in countries 
where deficits were higher than 3 per cent of GDP in 2005. In Germany, tax 
increases together with continued low growth of government expenditure will 
contribute to reducing the deficit. The most important measure in terms of 
taxation will be the VAT increase in 2007, accompanied by measures on social 
contributions (see German developments in the forecast section). We expect 
the fiscal stance to be around 0.8 percentage points of GDP tighter, with 0.4 
percentage points of this coming from the VAT tax package. Other measures 
are also expected to intentionally tighten fiscal policy and in addition revenues 
have been stronger than anticipated using model based forecasting equations. 
In 2008, fiscal policy will be less restrictive. A major reform of corporate 
taxation is planned (see Box 2.2) but is currently expected to have little effect 
on the deficit. 
 
In Italy, the Budget Law will be presented by the Government at the end of 
September, after the publication of this report. We forecast that the 
Government is willing to reduce the government deficit and debt, seizing the 
opportunity of the current economic recovery to consolidate fiscal balances. 
This will result in a restrictive fiscal policy for the next two years and would 
bring the Italian deficit below 3 per cent of GDP but only in 2008. In fact, 
because the improvement of the fiscal balance this year has been mainly due to 
cyclical and random factors, including stronger then expected revenues 
especially from corporate taxation, the budget plans for 2007 still remain quite 
ambitious.   
 
The French deficit will remain slightly below 3 per cent of GDP, with GDP 
forecasts remaining almost unchanged as compared to six months ago. As in 
Italy, the budget plans will be released by the French government at the end of 
September, ahead of an electoral year but we expect that the government will 
stick to existing plans which include very low increase in public spending and 
already announced cuts in income taxation. The fiscal stance would be slightly 
restrictive over the 2008 horizon, leaving the deficit below 3 per cent of GDP.  
 
In countries running surpluses or close to zero government balances, the fiscal 
stance is expected to be neutral or expansionary (see Table 2.2.2). 
 
In terms of fiscal measures, the issue of corporate taxation remains high on the 
agenda in the Euro Area. A number of countries are in the process of lowering 
domestic corporate taxation. New measures are planned or being under 
discussion for the coming years, like in Germany or Spain. This raises again the 
issue of tax competition in Europe. We focussed on this issue in the 
EUROFRAME-EFN report special topic in October 2005. 
 
THE EXPECTED FISCAL STANCE 
                                                 
2 This does not take into account the recent judgement of the European Court of Justice 
concerning the reimbursement of VAT paid on cars owned by firms. This could increase the 
deficit by around 0.5 percentage points. 
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Table 2.2.2 shows measures of the fiscal stance for Euro Area countries, using 
trend output growth from NiGEM. Under the assumption of a trend growth 
of slightly below 2 per cent at the Euro Area level, the cyclical component of 
the Euro Area deficit will be improved by 0.3 percentage point this year. With 
a fiscal tightening close to 0.2 percentage points (a vanishing effect of one-off 
measures counterbalances slightly lower interest payments), government 
balances will improve by 0.5 per cent of GDP. Fiscal policy will also tighten by 
an average 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2007 and 2008. However, as in previous 
years this masks different patterns among member states.  
 
A major issue of the current debate is of course whether it is appropriate to 
tighten fiscal policy so much in Germany at this stage. The announced rise in 
VAT, in particular, will put at risk the long expected recovery in domestic 
demand in Germany. 
Table 2.2.2: GDP growth, fiscal balances in the EUROFRAME-EFN forecast  
and fiscal impulses 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany 0.8 1.1 2.4 1.4 1.6 
France 2.0 1.2 2.2 2.0 2.0 
Italy 0.9 0.1 1.6 1.3 1.3 
Spain 3.2 3.5 3.5 2.8 2.9 
The Netherlands 2.0 1.5 3.2 3.1 2.1 
Belgium 2.4 1.5 2.7 2.5 2.6 
Austria 2.7 2.1 3.0 2.1 2.0 
Finland 3.3 3.0 4.9 2.6 2.6 
Portugal 1.2 0.4 1.3 1.5 2.2 
Greece 4.7 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.1 
Ireland 4.3 5.5 5.8 5.0 5.0 
Euro Area-11 (1) 1.7 1.4 2.6 1.9 2.0 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3.7 -3.3 -2.4 -1.6 -1.4 
France -3.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.4 
Italy -3.5 -4.1 -3.8 -3.3 -2.9 
Spain -0.2 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.5 
The Netherlands -2.1 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Belgium -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
Austria -1.2 -1.6 -1.6 -1.2 -0.9 
Finland 1.9 2.4 3.0 2.8 3.2 
Portugal -3.2 -6.0 -4.4 -3.7 -3.1 
Greece -6.8 -4.4 -2.9 -3.1 -3.1 
Ireland 1.6 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Euro Area-11 -2.8 -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.4 
One-off measures, per cent of GDP 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 
France 0.1 0.5 0.0 0 0 
Italy 1.3 0.5 0.3 0 0 
Spain -0.7 0 0 0 0 
The Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0.0 0.4 0.6 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 2.3 0.2 0 0 0 
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.6 0 0 
Ireland 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0 0 
Euro Area-11  0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Fiscal impulse, under NiGEM trend output growth assumptions, per cent of GDP (2) 
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Germany  -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 
France -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 
Italy -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -1.1 -0.4 
Spain -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.1 0.3 
The Netherlands -0.9 -1.7 0.2 0.5 0.1 
Belgium 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.1 
Austria 0.0 0.5 0.5 -0.5 -0.4 
Finland 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.4 
Portugal 0.5 0.6 -2.1 -0.7 -0.5 
Greece 1.4 -2.0 -0.6 -0.2 0.0 
Ireland -1.0 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
Euro Area-11 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 
(1) Excluding Luxembourg. (2) Excluding one-off measures. Fiscal impulse here is the 
opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, derived from 
EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off measures, with 
trend output growth as in NiGEM 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN Autumn 2006 forecast, Eurostat, own assumptions. 
 
  
Box 2.2: Reform of Business Taxation in Germany, An Assessment by 
IfW Kiel 
Taxes on capital income are relatively high in Germany. In particular, the 
marginal as well as the average effective tax rates on the return of investment 
in real capital are higher than in other EU countries (see Annual Report of the 
German Council of Economic Advisors 2005). The high tax rates dampen 
investment in machinery and equipment and reduce the attractiveness of 
Germany as a location of production. In addition, the German system of 
corporate income taxation is heavily distorting the decision on whether to 
distribute or retain profits. 
In order to improve incentives for investment and the position of Germany in 
the international competition for capital, the German government has 
proposed to cut taxes on profits of corporations and non-corporations. 
According to the plan, the overall tax rate for corporate profits will be reduced 
from about 39 to about 30 per cent starting in 2008 (Table 2.2.3). As to 
dividends, the existing tax relief (only 50 per cent of the dividend is subject to 
taxation) will be abolished, while the marginal personal income tax rate, which 
currently is applied, will be substituted by a single rate of 30 per cent (Table 
2.2.4). These measures would foster investment and increase the “tax 
competitiveness” of Germany, although there is no progress in terms of 
neutrality with respect to the decision on how to use profits.  
However, in order to limit the negative impact on the tax revenues, the 
government wants to tax a part of the interest paid by firms on their debt. 
Details are not yet determined, but introducing the measures under discussion 
would reduce the positive effects resulting from the cut in tax rates. The 
overall effects would be marginal. The growth of potential output in Germany 
would not significantly be affected. 
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Table 2.2.3: Elements of the Proposed Reform of Taxes on Corporate Profits 
 Status quo Reform proposalb 
1. Corporation tax (per 
cent) 
  
 Nominal rate 25.00 12.50 
 Effective rate 20.66 12.50 
2. “Gewerbesteuer”a (per 
cent) 
17.36c 
 
16.80c 
3. Solidarity surcharge (per 
cent)   
 Nominal rate 5.50 5.50 
 Effective rate 1.14 0.69 
4. Overall rate 39.16 29.99 
aThe tax base is the sum of profits, 50 per cent of interest paid on long-term debt and some deductables. 
— bChanges as to the deductability of interest paid by firms are neglected. — cAssuming that the 
differences between the bases of the “Gewerbesteuer” and the corporation tax sum up to zero; assuming 
a tax rate for the “Gewerbesteuer” levied by the local governments which is on average 420 per cent 
(„Hebesatz“) times 0.05 and 0.04 (“Messziffer”) in the status quo and the reform proposal, respectively. 
 
Table 2.2.4: Taxes on Profits of Corporations – Illustrative Calculation 
According to Status Quo and Reform Proposal of the Federal Government 
 Status quo Reform proposala 
Profit 100 100 
„Gewerbesteuer“b (local tax) 17.36 16.80 
Base of the corporation tax 82.64 100 
Corporation tax 20.66 12.50 
Solidarity surcharge (5.5 per cent on the corporation 
tax) 
1.14 
 
0.69 
 
Tax burden in case of retention 39.16 29.99 
Net profit 60.84 70.01 
Income tax in case of distribution   
Tax rate 42 per cent 12.78c 21.00d 
Tax rate 15 per cent 4.56c 10.50d,e 
Solidarity surcharge (5.5 per cent)   
Tax rate 42 per cent 0.70 1.16 
Tax rate 15 per cent 0.25 0.58 
Net income of the shareholder   
Tax rate 42 per cent 47.36 47.85 
Tax rate 15 per cent 56.03 58.93 
Tax burden of the shareholder   
Tax rate 42 per cent 52.64 52.15 
Tax rate 15 per cent 43.97 41.07 
aChanges as to the deductability of interest paid by firms are neglected. — bAssuming that the 
differences between the bases of the “Gewerbesteuer” and the corporation tax sum up to zero; 
assuming a tax rate for the “Gewerbesteuer” levied by the local governments which is on average 
420 per cent („Hebesatz“)times 0.05 and 0.04 (“Messziffer”) in the status quo and the reform 
proposal, respectively. — cOnly 50 per cent of the dividend is taxed. — dWithholding tax on 100 per 
cent of the dividend: 30 per cent. — eAssuming that the withholding tax will be lowered according 
to the level of the personal marginal income tax rate. 
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 3. MACROECONOMIC 
DIFFERENTIALS AND 
ADJUSTMENT IN THE EURO 
AREA: STYLISED FACTS AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS1
There has recently been increased research and policy interest in the divergent 
macroeconomic performance in the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)2. Understanding the underlying factors of macroeconomic differentials, 
the source and transmission of shocks and the adjustment process in the euro 
area is important to appropriate economic policy in the EMU.  
3.1 
Introduction 
In a monetary union, the single monetary policy can only address 
common shocks. To adjust to asymmetric shocks – country specific shocks or 
idiosyncratic effects of common shocks, member countries have to make 
recourse to remaining tools of economic policy. In theory, the adjustment to 
asymmetric shocks and return to equilibrium can take place through four 
channels3: a) market - driven price and output adjustment; b) policy induced 
fiscal adjustment; c) insurance against country-specific shocks through fiscal 
transfers and financial integration; d) labour mobility.    
Temporary inflation and output growth differentials are likely in a 
common currency area since prices and output adjustment is required to 
absorb shocks. In the euro area, output growth and inflation differentials are 
also related to the ongoing catch - up process in some of the member 
countries. Persistent inflation differentials can have negative effects on incomes 
and investment and result in divergent competitiveness and monetary 
conditions in the participating countries. Furthermore, inappropriate use of 
national fiscal policy and real exchange rate adjustment can lead to poor 
macroeconomic performance.  
 
1 This paper was prepared by an EUROFRAME-EFN team led by the ESRI. The 
principal contributors were: Ali Al-Eyd (NIESR), Ray Barrell (NIESR), Michele Burattoni 
(PROMETEIA), Klaus-Jürgen Gern (IfW), John Fitz Gerald (ESRI), Monica Ferrari 
(PROMETEIA), Dawn Holland (NIESR), Ville Kaitila (ETLA), Markku Kotilainen (ETLA), 
Matthieu Lemoine (OFCE), Carsten-Patrick Meier (IfW), Stefania Tomasini (PROMETEIA), 
Iulia Traistaru-Siedschlag (co-ordinator, ESRI), and Ewald Walterskirchen (WIFO). We thank 
Sandra Proske, Carolin Mainz, Jean Goggin and Claire Delaney for their excellent research 
assistance. We are grateful to Mary McCarthy, Jürgen Kroeger, Lars Jonung and DGECFIN 
staff for fruitful discussions and colleagues from the EUROFRAME-EFN network for useful 
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Catherine Mathieu, Henri Sterdyniak (OFCE) and 
Ewald Walterskirchen (WIFO) expressed a dissenting view (Annex A9).    
2 See for example, Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry (2006), Benalal et al (2006), Busetti et al 
(2006), European Commission (2006a), Honohan and Lane (2003), Mongelli and Vega (2006), 
Lane (2006). 
3 For an extensive discussion see Alesina et al (2001), De Grauwe (2003), Baldwin and 
Wyplosz (2004).  
49 
50 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
The objective of this paper is to analyse macroeconomic differentials and 
the adjustment in the euro area so far with the aim to draw lessons and policy 
implications for the better functioning of the EMU and euro area enlargement. 
The questions we address are the following: What do we know about 
macroeconomic differentials in the euro area? Are they temporary or 
persistent? What factors underline them? What is the likelihood of asymmetric 
shocks in the euro area and what are their main transmission channels? What 
policy issues related to the macroeconomic adjustment in the EMU are most 
important at this stage?  What lessons can be learned from country-specific 
experience with macroeconomic adjustment under EMU? 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. In Section 2 we 
analyse the size, evolution, persistence and underlying factors of output growth 
and inflation differentials. Section 3 discusses the likelihood of asymmetric 
shocks and their transmission across the euro area countries. In particular, we 
analyse trade linkages, including intra- and extra-euro area trade, financial 
openness and the impact of equity price shocks on GDP, and business cycle 
synchronization. In Section 4 we discuss a number of policy issues related to 
the macroeconomic adjustment in EMU which have gained increased interest 
recently. We start with the role and effects of real interest rate and 
competitiveness differentials as adjustment channels. In relation to this, we 
address the risks associated with housing booms in some euro area countries. 
We discuss next policy issues related to fiscal adjustment and the impact of 
fiscal shocks in the euro area countries. Further, we summarise the experiences 
with macroeconomic adjustment under EMU in Italy and Finland. Finally, 
Section 5 summarises the main findings and draws policy implications for the 
EMU and the euro area enlargement.      
 
 
While it is still too early to formally assess the benefits and costs of the EMU4, 
the existing evidence suggests that since the adoption of the single currency, 
macroeconomic performance for the euro area as a whole has improved, in 
particular with respect to inflation and unemployment rates in comparison with 
the previous seven years. Furthermore, inflation and unemployment 
differentials have declined while output growth differentials have remained 
stable (see Table 1).  
 3.2 
Macroeconomic 
Differentials 
Output growth dispersion has remained stable throughout the period 
1992-20055 with average annual real GDP growth rates persistently above the 
euro area in Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland and persistently 
below the euro area in Germany and Italy. Over the same period, five countries 
experienced positive inflation differentials with respect to the euro area – 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal while in Belgium, Germany, France, 
Austria, and Finland inflation rates were below the euro area average. 
Unemployment rates were above the euro area average in Spain, France, Italy 
and Finland and lower than the euro area in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Austria and Portugal.  
 
 
 
4 To properly assess the EMU impact on macroeconomic performance a counterfactual 
would need to be constructed, which is beyond the objectives of this paper. This is not an easy 
task in particular because it is difficult to separate the effect of EMU from global developments 
in trade and financial integration.  
5 The data for 2005 used throughout in this paper are the European Commission’s 
estimates of April 2006 (European Commission, 2006b) 
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Table 1: Macroeconomic differentials in the euro area 
 
  Real GDP growth GDP price deflator Unemployment rate 
  1992-98 1999-05 1992-98 1999-05 1992-98 1999-05
Euro area 1.8 1.9 2.6 1.8 10.1 8.5 
Belgium 0.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -1.1 -0.7 
Germany -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -1.1 -2.0 -0.1 
Greece 0.0 2.4 7.3 1.8 -0.8 2.1 
Spain 0.5 1.7 1.5 2.1 7.1 2.3 
France 0.0 0.3 -1.2 -0.4 1.0 0.9 
Ireland 5.4 4.6 1.0 2.1 2.3 -3.9 
Italy -0.5 -0.7 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.5 
Luxembourg 1.8 2.9 -0.3 0.7 -7.4 -5.2 
Netherlands 0.9 -0.2 -0.7 1.0 -4.4 -5.1 
Austria 0.4 0.1 -0.9 -0.3 -6.1 -4.3 
Portugal 0.6 -0.3 3.1 1.4 -3.9 -3.1 
Finland 0.7 0.9 -0.3 -0.6 4.0 0.7 
St. Deviation 1.6 1.6 2.4 1.1 4.2 2.8 
      
     Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base 
 
In this section we examine stylized facts and underlying factors of 
output growth and inflation differentials in the euro area countries and 
discuss the extent to which they may be linked to adjustment under the 
EMU.  
 
       OUTPUT GROWTH DIFFERENTIALS  
 
The dispersion of real GDP growth across the euro area countries 
measured by the unweighted standard deviation6 has been fluctuating 
around a level of 2.0 percent since the beginning of the EMU in 1990. 
The output growth dispersion has declined in the  group of small 
countries7, while it has increased among the four largest euro area 
economies8 (see Chart 1).   
Output growth differentials have been persistent since 1994 as 
suggested by the correlation coefficients of real GDP growth 
differentials (Table 2). This evidence suggests that the single currency 
has not made output growth differentials more persistent than they were 
previously.  
 
 
6  This measure of dispersion gives equal importance to the Euro area countries. This is 
convenient to our analysis of stylized facts. An alternative dispersion measure, the weighted 
standard deviation may be misleading because, given the high weights in terms of GDP of the 
four largest countries, it is similar to the unweighted standard deviation for these countries.       
7 Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland 
8 Germany, France, Italy and Spain  
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 Chart 1:  The dispersion of real GDP growth across the euro area,  
  big and small countries, 1990-2005   
Unweighted standard deviation of annual average real GDP 
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   Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base  
 
 Table 2: Correlation coefficients of real GDP growth differentials: 1992-1998 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
        
1992 1.00       
1993 0.41 1.00      
1994 0.08 0.70 1.00     
1995 0.21 0.27 0.61 1.00    
1996 0.08 0.34 0.64 0.92 1.00   
1997 0.02 0.57 0.80 0.84 0.88 1.00  
1998 0.10 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.81 0.89 1.00 
 1999-2005 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1999 1.00       
2000 0.96 1.00      
2001 0.66 0.65 1.00     
2002 0.83 0.88 0.85 1.00    
2003 0.53 0.6 0.77 0.88 1.00   
2004 0.64 0.73 0.67 0.9 0.93 1  
2005 0.79 0.82 0.75 0.92 0.89 0.93 1 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base 
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THE ROLE OF  TREND AND CYCLICAL  COMPONENTS  
The analysis of output growth differentials suggests that they are driven by 
differences in the trend GDP growth rates while cyclical components of the 
output growth rates have become more synchronised in the euro area.  
Chart 2 shows the unweighted standard deviations of real GDP growth, 
trend GDP growth and output gap across the euro area countries over 1990-
20059. While the cyclical component of output growth has driven the 
dispersion of real GDP in Stage One of EMU, since 1995, the dispersion of 
trend GDP growth has been higher than the dispersion of the cyclical 
component. 
 
Chart 2:  The dispersion of real GDP growth, trend GDP growth and output 
 gap across the euro area, 1990-2005 
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Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base  
 
Further, as shown in Charts 3 and 4, over the period 1990-2005, in the 
euro area countries, real GDP growth differentials were highly correlated with 
trend growth differentials. The correlation coefficients were 0.98 over the 
period 1990-1998 and 0.99 over the period 1999-2005.   In particular, positive 
deviations from the euro area real GDP growth were associated with positive 
deviations from the euro area trend growth in Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece 
and Spain while in the cases of Germany and Italy, negative real GDP growth 
differentials were mirrored by negative trend growth differentials.  
Since 1994 the trend GDP growth dispersion in the four largest countries 
(EU-4) has increased steadily while the dispersion in the case of the small 
countries (EU-8) has declined since 2000 (Chart 5). This evidence suggests that 
the increasing dispersion of real GDP growth in the four largest euro area 
countries reflects increasing differentials in their trend growth.  
Trend growth has declined in Germany and Italy since the beginning of 
the 1990s while in Spain it has increased since 1993 (Chart 6). In the group of 
small economies, Ireland stands out for its performance. As shown in Chart 7, 
in Ireland, the trend output growth picked in 1997 stagnated in 1998 and has 
declined afterwards. Trend output growth has declined since 1997 in Portugal. 
In contrast, trend output growth has picked up in Greece since 1997.  
 
9 The data on trend GDP and output gap are taken from the AMECO data base 
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That output growth differentials are in line with trend growth differentials 
suggests that they are sustainable over time and they can persist without the 
need for adjustment.  
 
Chart 3: Real GDP growth, 1990-2005: deviation from the euro area average 
  (percentage points)  
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Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base 
 
Chart 4:  Trend GDP growth, 1990-2005: deviation from the euro area average 
               (percentage points)  
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Chart 5:  The dispersion of trend GDP growth across the euro area,  
 1990-2005 
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    Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base  
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Chart 6: Trend GDP growth in EU-4, 1990-2005 
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  Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base  
    
 Chart 7: Trend GDP growth in EU-8, 1990-2005 
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DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND OUTPUT GROWTH 
DIFFERENTIALS 
Demographic changes can affect real GDP through changes in population 
growth rates and working age population. To the extent that demographic 
developments vary across the euro area countries they can account for output 
growth differentials.  
To understand the role of demographic changes on output growth 
differentials we first decompose real GDP growth- GDP∆  - into the 
contributions of the real GDP per capita growth - 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∆
POP
GDP
and population 
growth : POP∆
POP
POP
GDPGDP ∆+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∆=∆
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       As shown in Chart 8, over the period 1999-2005, real GDP per capita 
growth had the largest contribution to real GDP growth across euro area 
countries. Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg, stand out for their high population 
growth rates10.  
 
  Chart 8: Decomposition of real GDP growth 
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Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base  
   
 
GDP per capita growth can be further decomposed11 in the contributions of 
the growth rates of working age ratio in total population 
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labour force ratio in total working age population (activity rate) 
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Labour productivity growth differentials have driven to a large extent real 
GDP per capita growth differentials in the euro area (Charts 9 and 10).   In 
particular, over the period 1999-2005, labour productivity growth was above 
the euro area average in Greece, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and France while in Spain, Italy and Portugal it was 
below the euro area average.  
This evidence suggests that divergent output growth in the euro area 
countries reflects primarily differences in supply conditions such as differences 
in demographic trends, activity and employment rates and long term 
productivity growth. 
 
10 Immigration has contributed to population growth in these countries  
11 Fitz Gerald (2006) uses this decomposition in the context of the convergence in  
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain 
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Chart 9: The decomposition of real GDP per capita growth (percent) 
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 Chart 10:   Labour  productivity growth, 1999-2005; deviation from the euro  
 area average (percentage points) 
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THE ROLE OF DEMAND COMPONENTS    
On average, real GDP growth in the euro area since the beginning of Stage 
Three of EMU has been driven by domestic demand with net exports 
contributing only marginally. The contribution of demand components to 
changes in real GDP has varied markedly across the euro area countries.  
While in Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Finland, real GDP 
growth has been driven both by domestic demand and net exports, in Greece, 
Spain, France, Italy and Portugal, domestic demand has been the main growth 
driving force with negative contribution from net exports. Growth in Germany 
has been driven mainly by net exports while domestic demand has lagged 
behind (Chart 11).  
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Chart 11:  The Contribution of demand components to changes in real GDP,  
  1999-2005 (percent) 
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THE ROLE OF RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT ON GROWTH 
DIFFERENTIALS 
Gern and Meier (2006)12 investigate the role of differences in residential 
construction activity in explaining growth differentials across the euro area 
countries. Special emphasis is given to the importance of demographic 
developments in explaining diverging trends in housing investment given that 
swings in housing investment in Germany over the recent two decades have 
been associated with pronounced changes in population growth. 
The paper first analyses residential investment growth over the past 40 
years for the eight largest euro area countries and for the euro area as a 
whole.13 The results suggest that, although there is some co-movement in 
national data for residential investment especially during recessionary phases 
(in terms of aggregate output) such as in the mid 1970s, the early 1980s and 
early 1990s, there are substantial differences across countries.  
In particular, a substantial part of the GDP growth differential between 
Germany and the rest of the euro area is due to the strong differences in 
residential investment growth which has been declining in Germany since the 
end of the 90s while expanding swiftly in the rest of the euro area. Inspection 
of demographic trends reveals that in Germany changes in population growth 
have been pronounced in the past two decades and demographic developments 
have differed markedly from those in the rest of the euro area.     
Further, the paper uses econometric techniques to analyse the housing in-
vestment in Germany and in the euro area. The models for Germany and the 
rest of the euro area estimate residential investment as a function of the 
existing level of housing stock, real income, the user cost of capital (proxied by 
the real interest rate) and population growth. The obtained estimates confirm a 
significant impact of population growth on residential construction in both 
cases.  
 
12 See Annex A1 
13 The euro area data used in this analysis have been constructed from national data that 
due to data limitations are confined to the 8 largest euro area economies Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland. These countries account for around 95 
percent of the euro area. 
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 In order to quantify the importance that demographic developments have 
through the channel of residential investment as an explanation of the growth 
differential between Germany and the rest of the euro area, a simulation of 
economic activity in the two regions is carried out assuming identical demo-
graphic trends. The results indicate that the profile of housing investment in 
Germany would have been significantly altered and much less different from 
that in the rest of the euro area. However, while the effect of differences in 
population growth is significant, differences in demographic developments are 
found to account for only 10-20 percent of the growth differential between 
Germany and the rest of the euro area that has been observed in recent years. 
Therefore, demographics is only a partial explanation of differences in intra-
euro area growth dynamics and other factors will have to be taken into 
account. 
Walterskirchen (2006)14 provides empirical evidence on the effects of 
residential investment and consumption on growth differentials across EU 
countries over the period 1995-2005.  He argues that these growth differentials 
can be attributed largely to the development of residential property prices and 
the responsiveness of consumption and residential building to house price 
changes. Specifically, rising real house prices in the UK, Ireland, the 
Scandinavian countries and Spain accelerated residential building and 
stimulated private consumption through wealth effects. Mortgage borrowing 
has grown radically in these countries, and the saving ratios of private 
households have declined. His cross-country analysis finds that an increase of 
house prices by 1 percent raised GDP growth by 0.15 percentage points.  
In contrast, in continental Europe, the stimulus of soaring house prices 
was lacking in the 1995-2005 period, with the exception of the Netherlands 
and in recent years France. The house prices outlook seems to be brighter for 
continental Europe. However, in countries with high house prices there is a 
substantial risk of falling prices in the future with negative effects on 
consumption and residential building. 
In market-based financial systems such as in Great Britain and Northern 
Europe, reactions to house prices and interest rate changes are clearly stronger 
than in bank-based systems such as in continental Europe.  
Despite the success achieved on a medium term basis by many countries 
with flexible residential property markets and market-based financial systems, a 
long-term growth strategy should not be based on these instruments, for 
soaring property prices tend to be followed by a downturn. 
 
SUMMARY 
Output growth differentials across the euro area countries have been stable and 
fairly persistent since Stage One of the EMU. While the dispersion of real 
GDP growth in the small countries has declined, in the four largest euro area 
economies it has increased since 1993.  The analysis of output growth 
differentials suggests that they were driven by differences in the trend growth 
while the cyclical components of the output growth rates have become more 
synchronized. Output growth higher than the Euro area in Ireland, Greece, 
Spain and Luxembourg, reflect higher trend growth rates while lower output 
growth in Germany, Italy and Portugal reflect declining trend growth rates. 
Thus, divergent trend growth in the four largest euro area economies is likely 
to explain their increasing dispersion of real GDP growth.  
14 See Annex A2 
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This implies that output growth differentials are sustainable and there is 
no need for country specific adjustment.  
 Real GDP growth for the euro area aggregate has been driven mainly by 
the growth of per capita real GDP. However, the contribution of population 
growth was relatively large in the cases of Ireland, Spain, and Luxembourg. 
Further, real GDP per capita differentials were driven by labour productivity 
growth differentials.  
This evidence suggests that divergent output growth in the euro area 
countries reflects mainly differences in supply conditions such as differences in 
demographic developments, employment rates, and long term labour 
productivity growth.  
The single currency may have an impact on output growth differentials 
through the housing channel of the common monetary policy transmission. 
Residential investment differentials explain partly growth differentials across 
the euro area countries. In particular, a substantial part of the growth 
differential between Germany and the rest of the euro area can be explained by 
the marked differences in residential investment growth. Further, the case of 
Germany illustrates that demographic trends play an important role in 
explaining diverging trends in housing investment differentials. 
 
3.2.2  INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS 
Changes in relative prices are necessary to absorb country specific shocks in a 
monetary union resulting in inflation differentials across the participating 
countries. In the euro area, inflation differentials are also related to country 
specific characteristics such as sectoral specialisation, trade openness and trade 
composition, national economic policies, in particular fiscal and wage policies15.  
To what extent do inflation differentials matter? The answer to this 
question requires understanding the persistence and underlying factors of 
diverging country inflation rates from the euro area average. Temporary 
inflation divergence related to transitory shocks and the convergence process 
may be necessary in a monetary union. Within the euro area, such inflation 
differentials may be driven by several factors including the price level 
convergence for tradable goods and services (due to increased market 
integration and cross border price transparency) and non-tradable goods and 
services (the Balassa-Samuelson effect, due to faster productivity growth in the 
tradable goods sector) (ECB, 2005).  In contrast, persistent inflation 
differentials due to a slow adjustment and misaligned national policies should 
raise a warning flag.  
Persistent deviations from the euro area average have a direct impact on 
fixed nominal incomes, real returns on savings and investment and wage 
setting (Honohan and Lane, 2003). An important direct consequence of 
persistent inflation differentials is persistent disparities in real interest rates 
which may be amplified by cyclical factors (Busetti et al, 2006). In addition to 
changes in the price level, inflation volatility raises price level uncertainty and 
has negative effects by raising risk premia, hedging costs and unanticipated 
redistribution of wealth and can thus hamper growth (Rother, 2004).  
 
 
15 For a detailed analysis see Honohan and Lane (2003), Altissimo et al (2005) and Lane 
(2006) 
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Chart 12: Inflation dispersion, 1990-2005  
GDP deflator 
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   Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO database   
 
  Chart 12 shows that inflation differentials across euro area countries 
measured with the unweighted standard deviation of the GDP deflator have 
declined significantly over the period 1990-1997 and stabilized afterwards. This 
suggests that the EMU has had a beneficial effect on the macroeconomic 
stability in particular in countries which had high inflation rates.  
Looking at different inflation measures, Chart 13 shows that import price 
differentials were more pronounced than the GDP deflator and the private 
final consumption expenditure deflator. This points to the impact of different 
trade patterns, in particular different intra- and extra-euro import patterns in 
the euro area countries.  
Over the period 1999-2005 positive inflation deviations from the euro 
area average have persisted in Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, while negative 
inflation differentials have persisted in Germany and Austria (Table 3). 
 
Chart 13: Inflation dispersion, 1990-2005 
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Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO database   
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  Table 3:  Inflation rate (HICP), 1999-2005: deviation from the euro area average 
 1999-05 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Euro 
area 2.0 1.1 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 
BE -0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 0.3 
DE -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9 -1.1 -0.3 -0.3 
EL 1.2 1 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.3 0.9 1.3 
ES 1.1 1.1 1.4 0.4 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.2 
FR -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.3 
IE 1.5 1.4 3.2 1.6 2.4 1.9 0.2 0.0 
IT 0.3 0.6 0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.0 
LU 0.6 -0.1 1.7 0 -0.2 0.4 1.1 1.6 
NL 0.6 0.9 0.2 2.7 1.6 0.1 -0.7 -0.7 
AT -0.3 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.1 -0.1 
PT 1.0 1.1 0.7 2.0 1.4 1.2 0.4 -0.1 
FI -0.4 0.2 0.9 0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -2.0 -1.4 
St. 
Dev.  0.7 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.9 
 
 Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO database   
 
FACTORS UNDERLYING INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS IN THE 
EURO AREA 
Conventional theory of inflation divergence within currency union points to 
asymmetric demand shocks and productivity growth differentials in the traded 
sectors as explanatory factors. Inflation differentials in the euro area can be 
explained by a combination of factors that can be grouped in three categories 
(ECB, 2005): a) transitory factors related to the convergence process; b) long-
lasting permanent structural differences; c) policy induced factors. 
Factors related to the convergence process include the convergence of 
nominal interest rates within the euro area; price level convergence for tradable 
goods due to market integration and cross-border price transparency; price 
level convergence for non tradable goods and services. Structural differences 
refer to differences in trade openness, the composition of international trade, 
trade links with non-euro area countries; wage and price setting rigidities. 
Policy induced factors include pro-cyclical effects of national fiscal policies; 
effects of national wage bargaining agreements; different transmission 
mechanisms of the common monetary policy.   
Euro area inflation differentials can be decomposed using an inflation 
accounting methodology.16 We analyse the following decompositions of 
inflation deviations from the euro area average: a) the final demand deflator 
differentials decomposed into contributions of domestic costs and import cost 
differentials; b) unit labour costs differentials decomposed into differentials 
due to compensation per employee and labour productivity.   
 
16 See also ECB ( 2003) 
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The decomposition of the final demand deflator deviations from the euro 
area average is shown in Chart 14. Over the period 1999-2005, domestic costs 
were the main driving factor of inflation differentials in Germany, Greece, 
Spain, Ireland, Netherlands, and Portugal, while import costs predominated in 
Belgium, France, Italy, Austria and Finland.  
The decomposition of unit labour costs differentials is shown in Chart 15. 
On average, the dynamics of the compensation per employee was more 
important than labour productivity growth. In particular, higher than average 
unit labour costs were driven by compensation per employee in Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal. Compensation per employee and 
labour productivity were equally important in Finland.  
In Italy higher than average compensation per employee growth was 
associated with lower than average productivity growth17. In Germany and 
Austria lower than average unit labour costs were due to lower than average 
compensation per employee growth despite better than average labour 
productivity growth.   
 
Chart 14:  Final demand deflator, 1999-2005, deviation from the euro area 
average: The contribution of domestic costs and import costs  
 (percentage points) 
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Chart 15:   Unit labour costs, 1999-2005, deviation from the euro area average:  
The contribution of the compensation per employee and  inverse 
labour productivity (percentage points) 
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17 For a detailed analysis in the case of Italy, see Burattoni, Ferrari, and Tomasini (2006), 
Annex A6 to this paper 
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SUMMARY  
Inflation differentials across euro area countries have been declining. Positive 
inflation deviations from the euro area have persisted in Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, In contrast, Germany, and Austria experienced persistent negative 
inflation deviations from the euro area average. 
Our analysis of factors underlying these inflation differentials suggests 
that they were driven by country specific factors. Domestic costs were the 
main driving factor of inflation differentials in Germany, Greece, Spain, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal, while import costs predominated in 
Belgium, France, Italy, Austria and Finland. With respect to unit labour costs 
differentials, on average the dynamics of the compensation per employee was 
more important than labour productivity growth. Specifically, higher than 
average unit labour costs growth were driven by compensation per employee 
growth in Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal. In 
contrast, in Germany and Austria, lower than average unit labour costs growth 
were due to lower than average compensation per employee growth despite 
better than average labour productivity growth. 
To the extent that inflation differentials in the euro area are temporary 
and reflect a transitory and necessary adjustment of relative prices in response 
to asymmetric demand shocks and productivity differentials in the traded 
sector, they are part of the macroeconomic adjustment and they are expected. 
The common monetary policy has as an objective the price stability for the 
euro area aggregate and cannot address regional inflation differentials. 
However, persistent inflation deviations from the euro area average have 
negative effects on the consumer and investment climate including foreign 
direct investment. In particular, inflation differentials have a strong and direct 
impact on fixed nominal incomes, real returns on savings and investment and 
wage settings.  
 
 
In the EMU, the ECB pursues price stability for the euro area as a whole and 
consequently member countries have to use the remaining tools of economic 
policy to adjust to asymmetric shocks.  Understanding the nature of external 
shocks and their transmission channels is essential to deciding on the 
appropriate policy instruments. To asses the likelihood and transmission of 
asymmetric external shocks to the euro area countries we analyse trade and 
financial linkages and business cycle synchronisation.   
3.3 
Macroeconomic 
Linkages and 
Transmission of 
Shocks 
 
3.3.1  TRADE LINKAGES 
The analysis of trade integration patterns is important for assessing the 
transmission of shocks in the euro area for at least three reasons.  
First, trade integration between similar and open economies reduces the 
cost of losing flexibility over the exchange rate. As shown by McKinnon 
(1963), in theory, this follows from the equalization of prices18 of most traded 
goods when expressed in the same currency as a result of increased 
competition. In this case, exchange rate changes will have relatively small 
effects.   
 
18 The law of one price  
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Second, the higher the degree of trade openness, the higher the benefits 
from adopting a common currency as a result of reduction of transaction costs. 
Third, increased trade integration fosters the transmission of common shocks 
across countries and the synchronisation of business cycles19.  
In the context of exposure to and transmission of shocks to the euro area 
economies it is important to distinguish between intra- and extra-euro area 
trade patterns. Table 4 shows that over the period 1999-2005, for the euro area 
aggregate, intra-euro area trade openness was 27.8 percent of GDP, slightly 
lower than extra-euro area trade openness, 28.4 percent of GDP. Intra-euro 
area trade openness was the highest in Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands and the lowest in Greece, Finland and Italy. Extra-euro area trade 
openness was the highest in Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland and 
the lowest in Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal.  
Significantly, compared with the period 1990-1998, extra-euro trade 
openness has increased by 6.7 percentage points, relatively more than the intra-
euro area openness increase by 4.7 percentage points. 
These stylized facts are in line with Micco et al. (2003) who find that, after 
controlling for other factors, euro area membership has had a higher effect on 
extra-euro area trade, ranging from 8 to 16 percent, while for bilateral intra-
euro area trade the EMU effect has been smaller, ranging from 4 to 10 
percent20. Since the adoption of the single currency, with the exception of 
Belgium and Spain, extra-euro area has increased to a larger extent in 
comparison with the intra-euro area trade. Extra-euro area trade is important in 
particular in the cases of Ireland, with average extra-euro area trade 74 percent 
of GDP compared to 35.5 percent intra-euro area trade, while in Finland the 
shares are 40.7 percent compared with 19.9 percent respectively. 
The extent of extra-euro area trade has implications for the exposure to 
external shocks and the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate. Kaitila 
(2006)21 provides a detailed analysis of extra-euro area trade flows over the 
1990-2005. We discuss below a summary of this analysis, in particular, euro 
area aggregate flows and trade linkages with the United Kingdom (UK), United 
States (US), Switzerland, Japan, China, Russia and India. 
The euro area’s largest trading partner is the UK followed by the US, 
China, Switzerland and Japan. Imports from the UK as a share of total extra- 
euro area imports amounted to an average of 13.7 percent over the period 
1999-2005, which is 2.6 percent lower than the average for the 1993-1998 
period. Exports to the UK as a share of total extra -euro area exports were 18.3 
percent on average over the period 1999-2005, similar to the average of 18.7 
percent for 1993-1998 period. Relative to total imports and exports, the UK is 
a major trade partner for Ireland and accounts for large trade shares, albeit 
declining, in the cases of Belgium, France and the Netherlands.  
19 For recent empirical evidence see Canova and Marrinan (1998), Frankel and Rose 
(1998), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2003), Imbs (2004) 
20 Baldwin (2006) estimates that the euro has boosted the intra-euro area trade by 5-10 
percent 
21 See Annex A3 
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 Table 4: Trade (exports and imports of goods) as percent of GDP, 1999-05  
  Intra-euro area Extra-euro area 
Euro 27.8 28.4 
Belgium 97.6 61.3 
Germany 23.6 32.1 
Greece 14.1 16.3 
Spain 24.3 18.5 
France 21.9 20.9 
Ireland 35.5 74.0 
Italy 19.3 21.3 
Luxembourg 70.6 16.6 
Netherlands 52.9 46.1 
Austria 41.0 29.7 
Portugal 34.1 16.6 
Finland 19.9 40.7 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the OECD International Trade data base   
 
The US is an important trade partner for Ireland and a major import 
source for the Netherlands as well as a major export destination for Germany 
and Italy. While the share of the US in the total imports of Euro area countries 
has been decreasing, the share of exports to the US has increased markedly in 
the case of Ireland.  
Switzerland is a main import partner as well as a main export destination 
for Germany, Italy and Austria. The shares of exports to Switzerland as a 
percentage of total exports have increased in particular in Italy and Ireland.  
The share of imports from Japan as a percentage of total imports has 
declined over the period for the majority of the euro area countries; the share 
of exports to Japan as a percentage of total exports has remained fairly 
constant during the Stage Three of EMU, although the latter has declined in 
comparison with the 1993-1998 period.  
China (including Hong Kong), Russia and India are also major trading 
partners for the euro area accounting on average over the period 1999-2005 for 
13.6 percent of extra-euro area imports and 7.8 percent of extra-euro exports. 
In particular, the importance of China has increased markedly over the last 
decade. The share of imports from China as a percentage of total Euro area 
imports has increased from 2.3 percent in 1995 to 5.6 percent in 2005. 
 Germany is the largest euro area importer from China, accounting for 32 
percent of total Euro area imports in 2005 followed by France and the 
Netherlands with China representing 16 percent of their total imports. Relative 
to GDP, imports from China are the largest in the cases of the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Ireland.  The share of exports to China as a percentage of total 
exports is the largest in Finland, followed by Germany, Italy and France. 
Exports to China as a percent of GDP are the highest in Belgium, Finland, and 
Germany.  
Russia accounts for 3 percent of euro area imports and just less than 2 
percent of the euro area exports in 2005. Germany is the largest euro area 
import partner for Russia accounting for 30 percent of euro area imports from 
Russia followed by Italy, the Netherlands, and France.  The share of imports 
from Russia as a percentage of total imports is the highest in Finland, 14 
percent followed by Germany with 4 percent. Germany is the largest euro area 
exporter to Russia with 41 percent of euro area exports.  
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The share of exports to Russia as a percentage of total exports is the 
highest in Finland (11 percent in 2005) followed by Germany, Italy and Greece 
(2 percent in their total exports). 
The contribution of India in the euro area trade is relatively less 
important, India is responsible for 0.6 percent of euro area imports and 
exports. The largest euro area importers from India are Germany, Belgium, 
Italy and France accounting for 72 percent of the euro area imports from 
India. The largest euro area exporter to India is Belgium accounting for 34 
percent of euro area exports to India followed by Germany with 28 percent of 
the euro area exports to India. The share of exports to India as a percentage of 
total exports is the highest in Belgium, 2 percent in 2005.      
 
SUMMARY 
Since the adoption of the single currency both intra- and extra-euro area trade 
have increased. Increased trade among the Euro countries fosters the 
transmission of country specific shocks and contributes to the co-movement of 
their economic activity. The extent of extra-euro area trade has implications for 
the exposure to shocks originating outside the euro area and volatility of the 
euro nominal effective exchange rate.  
External shocks originating in the largest trading partners of the euro area, 
namely, the UK, US, China, Switzerland and Japan can have asymmetric effects 
in the Euro area countries. The UK is a major trade partner for Ireland and 
accounts for large trade shares in the cases of Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands. The US is a major partner for Ireland and a major import source 
for the Netherlands as well as a major export destination for Germany and 
Italy. A possible sharp depreciation in the US dollar might negatively affect 
Ireland, Germany and Italy. The importance of China as a trading partner for 
the euro area has increased markedly over the last decade. Germany is the 
largest euro area importer from China followed by France and the Netherlands. 
Relative to GDP, imports from China are the largest in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Ireland. The share of China as a percentage of total exports is the 
largest in Finland, followed by Germany, Italy and France. Exports to China as 
a percent of GDP are the highest in Belgium, Finland and Germany.    
 
3.3.2  FINANCIAL LINKAGES  
Financial integration can act as an adjustment mechanism to country – specific 
shocks by smoothening consumption over time through cross-border portfolio 
diversification (Kalemli-Ozcan et al, 2001). Furthermore, financial integration 
plays an important role in the transmission of the common monetary policy. 
Consumption growth rates in the euro area are less correlated than GDP 
growth rates suggesting that the level of risk sharing in the Euro area is low 
(Adjaoute and Danthine, 2003 and 2004). However, recent evidence suggests 
that the adoption of the euro has fostered financial integration among the euro 
area member countries (Baele et al, 2004; Lane, 2006). Using various price-
based and news-based measures, Baele et al., (2004) find that the degree of 
integration differs across various Euro area markets, money and government 
bond markets are highly integrated, corporate bond and banking markets are 
quite well integrated while equity markets are the least integrated.  
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Furthermore, while the euro has fostered financial markets integration, a 
contemporaneous increase in global financial linkages outside the euro area 
may have contributed as well (Lane and Wälti, 2006).  
Berben et al (2006) analyse the relationship between wealth gains and 
losses on actual and planned savings in the Netherlands and find that 
households’ responsiveness to equity shocks is asymmetric with a stronger 
reaction to capital losses in comparison to capital gains. This asymmetric 
reaction is likely to influence the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth.    
Al-Eyd, Barrell and  Holland (2006)21 analyse and discuss the impact of a 
series of equity price shocks at the individual country and global levels using 
the NiGEM model. They first simulate the impact on GDP of an exogenous 
10percent increase in equity prices that is sustained over two years. The 
transmission of equity price shocks comes directly through asset price channels 
and indirectly through trade effects, where the magnitude of these disturbances 
depends on the degree of domestic stock market capitalization, the proportion 
of equities owned abroad, and the short and long run wealth effects in 
consumption and investment. 
One would expect the multiplier effects to be muted in countries where 
financial market liberalisation is less advanced, the marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth is small and domestic stock market capitalization is low. 
Conversely, one would expect to find large multipliers in countries with 
advanced financial systems, a larger propensity to consume out of wealth, 
strong dynamic wealth effects, and significant stock market capitalization  
For the single country equity price shocks, the impact on GDP 
strengthens successively over the first three years. The evidence of short-run 
impacts of wealth on consumption is weak in all euro area economies. There is 
stronger evidence of long run wealth effects – the delayed impact of the shock 
is pronounced in all of the euro area countries with the exception of the 
Netherlands and Ireland where the impact on GDP is largest in the second 
year. The actual pattern of adjustment in each country depends on the 
particular dynamics of consumption, asset accumulation and supply. Single 
country equity price shocks that persist for only two years have little impact on 
the domestic economy, as wealth effects on consumption are small and some 
equities are owned by foreigners.  
Coordinated equity price movements are likely to have much larger 
effects, and in recent years equity market shocks have exhibited a high level of 
cross-country correlation. A common global rise in equity prices of 10percent, 
sustained for two years is further simulated.  
Multipliers tend to rise with openness, measured as the share of total trade 
to GDP, in response to a global shock. Financial openness and integration also 
has a positive impact on the multipliers. Trade exposure to countries outside 
the euro area is particularly important, reflecting the fact that equity price 
impacts in countries such as the US and the UK tend to be higher than they are 
in the larger euro area economies. As the export exposure outside the euro area 
rises, the GDP multiplier also tends to rise. Investment in the US tends to 
speed up when real equity prices rise – there is little evidence that the same 
holds true in EU economies. Those countries that conduct high levels of trade 
with the US, such as Ireland, tend to have higher multipliers.  
 
21 see Annex A4 
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Chart 16 shows the impact on GDP after one year in response to a global 
equity price shock plotted against the export exposure outside the euro area. 
The Chart indicates that as exposure rises, the multiplier tends to rise as well. 
Chart 17 shows the importance of global spillover effects for euro area 
countries. The GDP multipliers in the first year are displayed for both the 
world and single country equity price shocks, and it can be clearly seen that the 
output effects determined through trade channels are considerably greater than 
those transmitted through domestic wealth channels. 
 
 
Chart 16:    World equity shock multipliers and global export exposure 
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Chart 17:    World versus single country equity price multipliers 
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SUMMARY 
Financial market openness is clearly a factor behind the propagation of shocks. 
Integrated economies are more exposed to spillovers from external shocks, 
while they return to equilibrium more quickly in response to domestic shocks. 
Research on the determinants of consumption suggests that the impact of 
changes in wealth on consumption levels in the euro area is small, at least in 
the short-term. Therefore, the impact of any shock to equity prices is likely to 
be small.  
It has also been shown that when euro area equity markets are shocked 
the effects are small. A global shock however has a more noticeable impact. 
Spillovers from global equity price shocks account for 80 to 90 percent of the 
impacts of a global shock in the euro area. 
Recent research points to an asymmetric responsiveness of households to 
equity shocks, with a stronger reaction to capital losses in comparison to capital 
gains. This asymmetry is likely to influence the marginal propensity to consume 
out of wealth. 
3.3.3  BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONIZATION   
Business cycle synchronisation is taken as an indication of a low probability of 
asymmetric shocks and a low cost of losing independence over monetary and 
exchange rate policies (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Alesina et al., 2002; Artis et al., 
2003).   
Business cycle synchronization across countries over a given period can 
be measured by cross-country correlations of actual real GDP growth rates or 
output gaps. Benalal et al (2006) analyse the business cycle synchronisation 
across the euro area countries since early 1970s until 2004 using both annual 
and quarterly data. They find that the co-movement of economic activity 
between the Euro area countries has increased in particular since the early 
1990s. The results are not sensitive to the data frequency and they hold for 
both big and small countries. The group of the largest countries (Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain) are more correlated in comparison with the group of 
the small countries. Belgium and France had the highest business cycle 
correlations with the rest of the euro area countries, while Greece, Ireland and 
Finland were the least correlated.  Furthermore, with the exception of 
Luxembourg, in all countries, the average business cycle correlations with the 
rest of the euro area have increased. In this respect, the performance of Ireland 
stands out. In order to distinguish the effects of European economic 
integration and EMU in particular on business cycle synchronisation from the 
impact of global trends such as the increasing world trade between 
industrialised countries, the authors look at the degree of the co-movement of 
economic activity for 12 non-euro OECD countries22 They find that this has 
not changed significantly since the 1980s and suggest that the increased 
business cycle synchronisation across the euro area countries may be a result of 
increased EU integration and the single currency. However, several caveats to 
this analysis should be kept in mind. For instance, no formal tests of statistical 
significance have been carried out.  
 
22 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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Furthermore, the group of 12 OECD countries used as a benchmark may 
not be fully representative for global developments.   
Boewer and Guillemineau (2006) take a step further in the analysis of 
business cycle synchronisation across Euro area countries and uncover their 
key determinants. Using data over the period 1980-2004 they find that bilateral 
business cycle correlations have increased significantly. This increased business 
cycle synchronisations appears strong in particular following the adoption of 
the single currency. The extreme-bounds analysis is applied to test the 
robustness of a large range of determinants including trade integration, 
structural and policy variables. The results indicate that bilateral trade has been 
a major driving factor of business cycle synchronisation in the Euro area 
through out the whole period and in particular before the adoption of the 
single currency. In particular, intra-industry trade between Euro area countries 
has increased in Stage Three of EMU. Furthermore, differences in industrial 
and financial sector structures have been significant determinants of business 
cycle correlation during the completion of the Single Market.  
Trade specialisation and short-term interest rate differentials are found 
robust determinants of business cycle correlation throughout the whole 
analysed period. Other factors including bilateral bank flows, economic 
sectoral specialisation, nominal exchange rate volatility and labour market 
flexibility come out as not robust. The authors point out that monetary 
integration has fostered intra-industry trade between Euro area countries and 
argue that this finding supports the endogeneity of optimum currency areas 
suggested by Frankel and Rose (1998). 
Massman and Mitchell (2004) analyse the relationship between the 
business cycles of the 12 euro area countries, by using 40 years of monthly 
industrial production data. They focus on eight parametric and nonparametric 
univariate measures of the “classical” and “growth” cycles. The investigation 
whether euro area business cycles have converged is based on a descriptive 
analysis of the distribution of bivariate correlation coefficients between the 12 
countries’ business cycles. The authors propose a statistical test for 
convergence based on the estimation of a dynamic heterogeneous panel data 
model. Their results indicate that the properties of the business cycles depend 
on how the business cycle is measured, in line with the findings of Canova 
(1998).  However, the examination of convergence between euro area business 
cycles indicates that there are substantive similarities across alternative 
measures of the business cycle. The euro area has been characterised by 
periods of convergence, associated with a rising mean correlation, a falling 
variance and with limited intra-distributional movement, and periods of 
divergence in the last 40 years. This fact is supported by the clearly negative 
relationship between the mean correlation coefficient and the variance of the 
correlation coefficients. 
Furthermore, Massman and Mitchell (2004) offer a tentative, and 
preliminary, interpretation of these facts that is consistent with Artis and 
Zhang’s (1997) view that business cycles synchronisation is positively related to 
monetary integration, specifically the degree of exchange-rate rigidity. 
Moreover, despite the volatility over the last 20 years, statistical tests indicate 
that the long-run trend over the last 20 years is one of rising correlations 
between euro area business cycles although there is at best weak evidence for 
divergence when attention is confirmed to just the last 10 years. However, it is 
too early to tell whether these recent tendencies will continue, and both the 
descriptive analysis and the statistical tests for convergence suggest that the 
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emergence of a common euro area business cycle has been far from smooth 
and stable. 
Lemoine (2006)23estimates an extended version of a bivariate Stochastic 
Cyclical Convergence Model (SCCM) developed by Ruenstler (2004) using an 
iterative Kalman Filter for measuring the convergence of business cycles 
between euro area countries and the euro area aggregate. The model combines 
unobserved component models with time-varying parameter models. The 
convergence between the two cycles is characterised by two time-varying 
parameters, the phase-shift and a weight, which is related to the phase-adjusted 
correlation. SCCM models are applied to the GDP of euro area countries, 
relative to the rest of the Euro area, over the period 1963:1 to 2002:4. His main 
results are twofold. Firstly, the cycles of the euro area have synchronised: their 
time-varying phases have generally converged toward low values (between -2 
and 2 quarters) before the launch of the euro. Concerning the time varying-
weights, results are more ambiguous. Germany, France and Belgium have 
converged toward the euro area cycle since 1980.  
The convergence is more recent for Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria 
and Portugal. Despite the launch of the euro in 1999, Finland, Greece and 
Ireland have still not converged. Thus, in terms of business cycle convergence, 
being in a monetary union might raise problems especially for the third group, 
which represents 5.8 percent of the euro area GDP. 
Economic integration is likely to have a stronger effect at regional level 
than at national level. This stronger effect can be expected because regions 
trade relatively more than countries and specialisation at regional level is higher 
than at national level (Krugman, 1993, Fatás, 1997). Thus, fluctuations of 
economic activity at regional level are expected to be more important than at 
national level which raises the question about  the extent of synchronisation of 
regional business cycles. Barrios and de Lucio (2003) argue that the dynamics 
of regional business cycles may condition the adjustment of national 
economies to economic integration.  
Tondl and Traistaru-Siedschlag (2006)24 provide empirical evidence about 
patterns and key determinants of growth cycle determinants across euro area 
regions. Using a panel data of 208 EU-15 regions over the period 1989-2002 
they estimate a system of four simultaneous equations to analyse the impact of 
regional trade integration, specialization and exchange rate volatility on 
correlations of regional growth cycles with the euro area. Their results suggest 
that deeper trade integration with the euro area had a strong direct positive 
effect on the synchronisation of regional growth cycles with the euro area. 
Industrial specialisation and exchange rate volatility were sources of cyclical 
divergence. Industrial specialisation had however an indirect positive effect on 
growth cycles synchronisation via its positive effect on trade integration, while 
exchange rate volatility had an indirect additional negative effect on growth 
cycle correlations by reducing trade integration. Industrial specialisation had an 
indirect negative effect on growth cycle correlations by increasing the exchange 
rate volatility. The direct impact of trade integration on growth cycle 
correlations was stronger in the pre-EMU sub-period, while in the EMU sub-
period, the negative direct effects of industrial specialisation and exchange rate 
volatility were stronger than in the pre-EMU sub-period. A distinct result is the 
positive and significant relationship between exchange rate volatility and 
 
23 See Annex A5 
24 See Annex  A6 
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growth cycle correlations in the pre-EMU sub-period, suggesting that over this 
period, country-specific exchange rate fluctuations acted as shock absorbers. 
The above results suggest a number of relevant policy implications for the 
EMU and euro area enlargement. First and foremost, promoting trade 
integration with the euro area is likely to foster regional growth cycle 
convergence and thus to lower the probability of regions’ exposure to 
asymmetric shocks.  
Real income convergence with the euro area average is expected to 
increase trade integration and at the same time affect the pattern of industrial 
specialisation towards more similarity which in turn will increase the regional 
growth cycles convergence with the euro area.  
 
 
In this sectio
adjustment in    3.4 
n we discuss policy issues related to the macroeconomic 
the Euro area which have attracted attention recently in both 
academic and policy making communities. We start with the adjustment 
triggered by inflation and output differentials. In relation to this, we discuss 
risks and policy issues in managing the housing sector in the euro area. Second, 
we ask how efficient is fiscal adjustment in a monetary union and analyse the 
impact of fiscal shocks on the euro area countries.  Third, we discuss the 
macroeconomic adjustment under EMU in Italy and Finland.     
Macroeconomic 
Adjustment in the Euro 
Area: 
Selected Policy 
Issues and Country 
Experiences 
 
3.4.1 PRICE AND OUTPUT ADJUSTMENT  
A smooth and fast correction of imbalances in a monetary union depends to a 
large extent on the efficiency and speed of wage and price adjustment. Flexible 
wages and prices can trigger macroeconomic adjustment through two channels: 
the real interest rates channel and the competitiveness channel. The real 
interest channel affects domestic demand: inflation higher (lower) than euro 
area inflation results in lower (higher) real interest rates which may foster 
(depress) domestic demand. The competitiveness channel affects the external 
demand through competitiveness gains (losses) in countries with inflation 
lower (higher) than the euro area.   
In reality, well-documented rigidities in labour and product markets25 
influence negatively the growth performance in the euro area. Furthermore, the 
interaction between the real exchange rate adjustment and the real interest rate 
developments in the euro area might lead to poor macroeconomic 
performance (overheating or overcooling)26   
 
THE REAL INTEREST RATE CHANNEL   
Real short term interest rates over 1999-2005 ranged from –0.5 percent in 
Ireland to 1.7 percent in Germany. Deviations of real short term interest rates 
from the euro area average have been negative in six countries including 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy while they 
were positive in Belgium, Greece, France, Austria, Finland and Germany 
(Chart 18).  
25 See for example Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005)   
26 See Deroose et al (2004) for a model-based analysis of adjustment to competitiveness 
and demand shocks in the Euro area.   
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Chart 19 shows a negative but weak correlation between short-term real 
interest rate differentials and domestic demand growth. While this evidence is 
indicative only27 it suggests that real short term interest rate below the euro 
average in particular in Ireland, Spain, and Luxembourg might have 
contributed to domestic demand growth in these countries, while in Germany, 
Austria, France, Finland and Belgium, real short term interest rates might have 
depressed domestic demand.  
  
 
Chart 18:  Real short term interest rate, 1999-2005: deviation from the euro 
area average (percentage points)  
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Chart 19:  Real short term interest rate differentials and domestic demand,  
 1999-2005 
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Average annual dispersion of real long term interest rates over 1999-2005 
has been 0.9 percent, lower than 1.2 percent for real short term interest rates. 
The highest dispersion of real long term interest rates was experienced in 2002 
and has declined afterwards. Average annual real long term interest rates over 
1999-2005 ranged from 1.0 percent in Ireland to 3.0 percent in Germany.  
They have been below the euro area average in seven countries: Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Italy and slightly 
 
27A formal econometric analysis would require longer time series 
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above the euro area average in Belgium, France, Austria, Germany, and Finland 
(Chart 20). 
      
    
 Chart 20:   Real long term interest rate, 1999-2005: deviation from the euro 
 area average (percentage points) 
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Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO database   
 
MANAGING THE HOUSING SECTOR IN THE EURO AREA  
As discussed above, there has been significant divergence in real interest rates 
facing households. For those living in countries experiencing an above average 
rate of inflation in consumer prices (and hence in wage rates) the expected 
future cost of borrowing is lower than in countries experiencing below average 
inflation rates. This reduction in financing costs, in turn, reduces the user cost 
of home-ownership encouraging higher investment (although, as indicated 
above, a number of other factors are also crucial in determining the level of 
investment in housing). It is no surprise that the rate of activity in investment 
in housing is well above the EU average in Spain and Ireland which are 
experiencing above average inflation while it is below average in Germany 
which is experiencing below average inflation. In turn the rising cost of 
accommodation can add to inflationary pressures by affecting the supply of 
labour (Duffy and Fitz Gerald, 2005). 
Over the last thirty years the housing market has been a source of 
significant economic instability on at least one occasion in each of quite a wide 
range of OECD economies. When housing bubbles have burst they have 
caused substantial damage to the affected economy. As a result, they are a 
cause for concern for economic policy makers. On some occasions when 
housing bubbles have burst they have also been associated with significant 
disruption to the domestic financial system (e.g. in the mid-west of the US in 
the mid 1980s and Scandinavia, 1989/1990).  When this has happened it has 
greatly aggravated the already serious macro-economic effects in the region. 
The analysis carried out in OECD (2005), indicates that when housing 
bubbles have occurred they have been essentially idiosyncratic in nature – they 
have generally not occurred simultaneously across major regions of the OECD. 
The analysis in Himmelberg et al (2005) also indicates that in the US there has 
not been a “US housing bubble” but rather a series of local bubbles in 
individual cities or regions at different times over the last quarter of a century. 
 There is no evidence that housing bubbles have become any more 
frequent over time and it is also interesting that, even with monetary union in 
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the US, there has not been any obvious tendency for a “convergence” of 
bubbles across the US. 
This idiosyncratic pattern reflects the fact that the drivers of housing 
prices are varied in nature and they include significant local or regional 
variables. Himmelberg et al. (2005) refer to the role of “superstar cities” where 
local circumstances can result in a prolonged period of higher than average 
growth in house prices.  
OECD (2005) and ECB (2006) analyse the role of “fundamentals” in 
determining house prices. This research, and the research on individual EU 
economies (e.g. Duffy, 2002; Murphy, 2006 on Ireland and European 
Commission, 2005), all indicate that while interest rates do affect house price 
inflation, it is only one of a range of driving variables. In the longer-term 
income growth and demographic change are probably more important drivers 
of changes in relative prices.  
 
Table 5:  Dwellings per 1000 inhabitants 
 
Country 
 
 
1997 
 
2002 
Denmark 466.0 472.0 
France 483.5 503.0 
Germany 452.0 472.0 
Hungary 394.0  
Ireland 322.0 384.1 
Netherlands 414.0 417.7 
Poland 300.4 307.7 
Portugal 470.0 502.0 
Spain  510.0* 
UK 424.5 432.6 
* data are for 2001. 
Source: http://www.unece.org/hlm/prgm/hsstat/Bulletin_04.htm.  
 
An important variable affecting the demand for dwellings is the existing 
stock of dwellings relative to the population. Table 5 shows the Charts for a 
number of EU countries for 1997, immediately before EMU began, and also 
for 2002. For most of the existing EU countries in 1997 the stock of dwellings 
was relatively high relative to the population and had not changed much. This 
suggested that in terms of demographic factors these countries were close to 
their equilibrium stock. However, for Ireland the stock was substantially lower 
than that of the other EU countries. With similar preferences and income 
levels it is not surprising that Ireland has seen a housing boom in recent years 
as the stock is adjusted closer to the level of other EU states. However, what is 
also striking about the data is that for two of the new member states – Poland 
and Hungary – their stocks of dwelling are also low. This would suggest that in 
the face of financial liberalisation and rising incomes they could see a similar 
boom to that currently being experienced in Spain and Ireland. If they were to 
join EMU, with low real interest rates the boom could be even more dramatic. 
Of course many other factors will drive the housing markets in these countries 
in the coming decade but the underlying demographic forces certainly suggest 
upward pressure on prices. 
Chavin and Le Bayon (2005) considered the housing markets in Spain, 
France, the UK and the US. Their conclusion was that of those four countries 
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only in Spain was there a risk of a housing bubble. Cameron, et al (2006) reach 
similar conclusions for the UK. In the EFN Spring 2006 report we considered 
the exposure of the Irish and Spanish economies to shocks. It was suggested in 
that report that in the case of both economies there was a risk of a housing 
bubble. Since then house prices have continued to rise in those two economies 
and the building construction sector has continued to increase its share of 
economic activity putting pressure on the tradable sector in both economies. 
Rae and van den Noord (2006), looking at the Irish economy suggest that 
house prices are now significantly above their equilibrium level. This pressure 
on the tradable sector is reflected in the gradual loss of competitiveness and 
rising balance of payments deficit. 
While EMU may not make housing bubbles any more likely, the 
restriction on the use of the interest rate to manage the domestic housing 
market could increase risks from housing shocks for individual economies.   
Even though the potential response of the housing market to interest rate 
changes is limited (though significant) for interest rate changes of one or one 
and a half percentage points (OECD, 2005; Rae and van den Noord, 2006) 
outside of EMU individual countries in the past have experienced significantly 
larger changes in interest rates, using such changes to manage their housing 
markets. However, this is no longer possible under EMU. There are, therefore, 
concerns, that the authorities in individual countries such as Ireland and Spain 
may be handicapped in managing potential risks to their economic stability 
arising from housing market developments. 
Within the euro area the risks to the financial sector from any potential, 
housing bubble will depend on the extent of the regional banking system’s 
exposure to the regional economy and its exposure within that economy to the 
housing (property) sector. Because of the fact that housing bubbles are 
essentially regional in nature the more geographically diversified the financial 
system is the more robust it will be in the face of shocks. However, it will be 
important for the regulatory authorities in stress testing their financial systems 
to take account of both the regional diversity of a bank’s loan portfolio and 
also to take account of the possible wider economic consequences of a housing 
bubble. In particular, when housing bubbles burst they tend to be associated 
with much wider macro-economic disruption which is likely to affect 
employment and output levels. 
The experience of the past both in the US and in Europe indicates that 
there is little danger of a euro-wide housing bubble posing problems for policy 
makers. However, regional booms can and are happening and past experience 
indicates that they can end suddenly with serious implications for the regional 
economy affected. In addition, serious problems in the housing market can 
affect the regional financial sector where problems of bad debt occur. Prior to 
EMU member states had the opportunity to manage the domestic housing 
market through monetary policy. However, under EMU monetary policy is 
targeted at the euro area inflation rate and, because of the idiosyncratic nature 
of the housing sector across the Euro zone, the stance of monetary policy will 
only help control housing bubbles by accident. 
Under these circumstances the best instrument available to governments 
to manage regional housing markets is fiscal policy. Through suitably targeted 
tax instruments the authorities can change the cost of housing services faced by 
households, influencing their investment behaviour. Using this instrument 
effectively may prove politically difficult, partly because of its political novelty. 
 However, as housing bubbles are as likely to happen in the future as in 
the past, it will be important for governments to develop an understanding of 
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the potential dangers of shocks in the housing sector to the wider economy 
and of the implications of EMU for how the housing market must be 
managed. 
A second important implication for policy is the need for the regulatory 
authorities to take appropriate measures to safeguard their domestic financial 
sectors. In stress testing the financial system they need to take account of the 
likelihood that macro-economic shocks may affect all economies within the 
EMU. Such shocks, whether or not they are combined, with a rise in real 
interest rates, may seriously affect the housing sector. While shocks to the 
housing sector are most unlikely to be generalised across the euro area, they 
may affect a number of regional economies simultaneously, such as in 
Scandinavia or the UK and Ireland. Under these circumstances the robustness 
of individual bank’s loan portfolio needs to be tested against shocks 
simultaneously affecting a number of the markets in which the banks trade. 
Finally, there are instruments, such as securitisation, which can significantly 
reduce the exposure of the financial system to local shocks to the housing 
market. 
THE COMPETITIVENESS CHANNEL       
Inflation higher than the euro area average results in the real exchange rate 
appreciation and thus competitiveness loss leading to a reduction of external 
demand.  Inflation lower than the euro area average leads to real exchange rate 
depreciation and competitiveness gains resulting in an increase in the external 
demand. 
Over the period 1999-2005, in particular, Germany, Austria, France and 
Belgium-Luxembourg and Greece have experienced real exchange rate 
depreciation while Ireland, Finland, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy 
have appreciated in real terms. Competitiveness gains have led to export 
growth in particular in Germany, Austria and Belgium-Luxembourg while 
competitiveness loss have affected negatively export growth in Italy, Portugal 
and Spain. Significantly, in Ireland, Finland, and the Netherlands export growth 
has remained above the euro area average despite their real exchange rate 
appreciation (Chart 21).  
These divergent developments in export growth performance may be 
explained by the product composition of exports. Due to their specialisation in 
low-tech products, which are sensitive to price competitiveness, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain have been affected by export competition from low cost countries, 
in particular China. Burattoni, Ferrari and Tomasini (2006)28 bring evidence 
from Italy illustrating this point.  
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Chart 21:  Real effective exchange rates (REER)* versus EU-12 and export 
growth differentials, 2000-2005 
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SUMMARY 
In a monetary union price and output differentials trigger adjustment through 
two channels: the real interest rate and competitiveness. In the euro area 
countries, real interest rates and real exchange rates developments had uneven 
effects on domestic and external demand.  In particular, in countries with 
positive output growth differentials, such as Ireland and Spain, low real interest 
rates might have added to domestic demand pressure while higher than the 
euro area real interest rates might have further depressed domestic demand in 
countries with output growth below the euro area average, in particular 
Germany and Austria. However, this evidence is weak and should be taken as 
indicative.  
Further, divergent real interest rates are reflected in divergent future costs 
of borrowing faced by households in the euro area countries. While housing 
prices are also driven by other country/region specific factors such as the 
existing stock of dwellings and demographic changes, housing markets can be a 
source of economic instability and can affect the regional financial sector where 
problems of bad debt occur. 
Real exchange rate adjustment has led to changes in external demand and 
export performance in the euro area countries. Competitiveness gains have led 
to export growth in particular in Germany, Austria and Belgium-Luxembourg 
while competitiveness losses have affected negatively export growth in Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. Significantly, in Ireland, Finland, and the Netherlands 
export growth has remained above the euro area average despite their real 
exchange rate appreciation. The case of Italy, illustrates that differences in the 
product composition of exports may explain these divergent developments in 
export growth performance.  
            
 
28 See Annex A7 
  
80 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
3.4.2  FISCAL ADJUSTMENT 
Given the lack of national monetary and exchange rate instruments in a 
monetary union, fiscal policy may be a key policy instrument in adjusting to 
macroeconomic shocks in the euro area (Calmfors, 2003, Mathieu and 
Sterdyniak, 2004, Wren-Lewis, 2000, 2002). However, in the case of small open 
economies the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy is limited due to 
import leakage (Hoeller et al, 2004).  
Colciago et al (2006) use a two-country New Keynesian DGE model with 
non-Ricardian consumers and a home bias in the composition of national 
consumption bundles to assess the role of national fiscal policies within a 
monetary union.  
They find that fiscal policy can be successful for macroeconomic 
stabilisation in a monetary union, in particular when combining elements of 
both government expenditure and taxation in the automatic stabilisers. 
However, in some cases conflicting views among national policy makers may 
emerge. Furthermore their results suggest that there may be redistributive 
effects in terms of consumer welfare.  
Recent research on fiscal adjustment (Perotti et al, 1998; von Hagen and 
Strauch, 2001; von Hagen, Strauch and Hughes Hallet, 2002) shows that the 
quality of fiscal adjustment is related to the relative contribution of different 
budgetary items to the adjustment effort. A fiscal consolidation is considered 
successful if the reduction in the budget deficit lasts for a number of years. 
Successful consolidations are fiscal adjustments based on expenditure cuts 
rather than increased revenues.  
Briotti (2004) finds that the composition of budget consolidation policies 
implemented by EU countries between 1991 and 2002 have had an effect on 
the durability of fiscal consolidation. Countries which relied more than others 
on revenue-based adjustment suffered the largest consolidation setbacks since 
2000.  
The extent of the consolidation is also relevant, as countries which 
implemented more limited and delayed consolidation have suffered from 
significant budget worsening in more recent years.  In relation to the cycle, 
fiscal policies show a clear bias in the period under examination. The analysis 
shows that fiscal policies were more pro-cyclical in high deficit countries than 
in low-deficit countries and in large countries than in small countries. In the 
first case, the risk of exceeding the fiscal reference values in bad times might 
have prompted pro-cyclical consolidation in countries with serious fiscal 
imbalances. In the second case, the worse budget positions recorded by larger 
countries might again explain why consolidation resumed in bad times. The 
analysis reveals that the pro-cyclical policies were those dominated by revenue-
based adjustments. This may have accentuated the distortionary effects of tax 
increases. 
Al-Eyd, Barrell and Holland (2006)29 use the NiGEM model and examine 
the impact of an expansionary fiscal policy in each of the euro area countries. 
The results are compared to a simulation where all euro area economies raise 
government spending at the same time. Government consumption expenditure 
is raised by 1 percent of GDP for 2 years. Short-term interest rates are held 
fixed for 2 years so that this fiscal expansion is not immediately offset by a 
monetary tightening. If interest rates are increased from year three, then the 
 
29 See Annex A4 
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long rate will increase in the first year of the shock and bond prices will fall. 
Since equity prices are the discounted present value of future profits, an 
increase in activity will raise profits and hence share prices may rise in the short 
term. This however, is offset by the negative impact of higher long rates, and in 
the second year of the shock equity prices in the euro area tend to fall. The 
exchange rate will appreciate immediately in anticipation of expected future 
rises in interest rates. 
With a small number of exceptions, this impact peaks after 2 years. As 
unemployment falls and capacity utilization increases, wages increase and 
inflation picks up. The peak in inflation typically lags behind the peak in the 
output response due to a gradual adjustment reflecting economic rigidities.  
In the single country shocks the interest rate response is small, particularly 
for the smaller euro area countries, as the small rise in inflation exhibited by 
these countries has little impact on the ECB target for the euro area as a whole. 
The exchange rate strengthens in the first quarter of the simulation in 
anticipation of the interest rate rise. Export prices rise relative to import prices, 
and there is a deterioration in net trade, which partially offsets the increase in 
output. In the long run, GDP, unemployment and inflation return to their 
baseline values. 
As shown in Chart 22 the fiscal multipliers are highly correlated with the 
import penetration ratios (imports relative to total final expenditure). Import 
penetration indicates the extent to which a rise in domestic demand will be 
offset by import leakages. This can be seen clearly for the very open economies 
including Belgium, and Ireland. 
 
 
Chart 22:  Fiscal multipliers and import penetration 
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The fiscal multipliers do not exhibit a strong correlation with equity 
market indicators, but the results illustrate how differences in the structure of 
financial markets in the euro area economies affect their response to domestic 
demand shocks. The more financially open the economy (as measured by the 
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ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP) the lower is the multiplier. This confirms the 
suggestion by Barrell and Gottschalk (2004) that increasing openness has 
reduced the volatility of cycles in the major economies. Financial openness acts 
as an automatic stabilizer in the same way as import leakages – the greater the 
stock of foreign liabilities, the more assets and income flows leak abroad when 
the economy expands. 
The euro area economies exhibit a stronger response to an area-wide fiscal 
expansion relative to a unilateral expansion. The major impact of this comes 
through trade, but some will come through cross holdings of equities and other 
financial assets. The correlation of the multipliers in response to an Area-wide 
shock with the ratio of foreign liabilities to GDP is somewhat lower in this 
more general shock, but still indicates a close relationship. 
 The equity price response is more significant in response to an Area-wide 
shock, as the impact on euro area interest rates is more pronounced. 
Chart 23 shows the size of the multiplier in each country in response to a 
Euro area-wide fiscal expansion relative to unilateral fiscal expansion. This can 
be thought as a measure of spillovers from the rest of the euro area, where a 
figure greater than 1 indicates that the multiplier is larger in response to the 
Area-wide shock. In the first two years of the shock, the Euro area-wide 
multipliers relative to the unilateral multipliers are highly correlated with the 
openness of the economy, measured as total trade relative to GDP. The more 
open economies benefit more from spillovers in the form of stronger export 
demand from the other expanding euro area countries.  
Those that conduct a higher share of trade within the euro area begin to 
reap additional benefits in the second and third years of the shock. In addition, 
exchange rate shifts have less impact on their competitiveness as compared to 
those with low trade intensity within the euro area. 
The euro area shock has a more significant negative impact on financial 
wealth than the unilateral shocks, as higher long rates reduce both bond prices 
and equity prices. The larger the short-run impact of wealth on consumption, 
the lower the demand spillovers in response to an area-wide shock. Spillovers 
are also strongly correlated with financial openness. 
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Chart 23:   Euro area-wide multiplier relative to unilateral 
multiplier
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SUMMARY 
Existing research suggests that discretionary fiscal policy is more effective in 
large countries while, due to import leakages, it is limited in small open 
economies.  Openness to foreign financial markets, as measured by the ratio of 
foreign liabilities to GDP, also reduces the scale of the multiplier as assets and 
income flows leak abroad when the economy expands. Revenue-based fiscal 
consolidations appear more likely to be pro-cyclical in comparison with 
expenditure-based budget adjustments.   
 
3.4.3 MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IN SELECTED EURO 
AREA COUNTRIES 
ITALY 
Burattoni, Ferrari and Tomasini (2006) present a detailed analysis of the 
macroeconomic adjustment experience in Italy30  
The experience of Italy is interesting for several reasons. First of all, the 
exposure of its manufacturing is high compared to other European countries. 
With the exception of Germany, the share of the manufacturing value added in 
GDP is higher in Italy than in most of the euro area countries. In addition, 
Italy has always been an export-led economy, and the exchange rate policy has 
been extensively used in the past in order to restore losses in competitiveness. 
So, the new exchange rate regime might have affected Italy more than other 
economies. Second, as far as the oil price and the cash changeover shocks are 
concerned, the Italian experience can be interesting because Italy is supposed 
 
30 See Annex A7 
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to have an inflationary bias. Third, due to the high public debt, the room for 
discretionary fiscal policy has been limited.  
The shocks that hit the European economies within the EMU were more 
costly for Italy because they affected some already existing vulnerabilities and 
some peculiarities of the Italian economy: prices and exports were influenced, 
in a context in which the exchange rate was no longer an instrument to 
maintain price competitiveness and the fiscal policy was strictly constrained. 
The interest rates at the historical minimum levels were not sufficient to 
counterbalance these negative impulses. The unsatisfactory growth over the 
last six years in Italy raises the question about  how to restore competitiveness 
and to foster GDP growth. 
As far as price competitiveness is concerned, negative gaps with respect to 
unit labour costs, consumer prices and export prices are still present. 
Nevertheless, there are clear signs of improvement: the consequences of the 
cash changeover, even if larger in Italy than elsewhere in the euro area, are now 
over; the oil price shock has been affecting prices in Italy less than in the other 
countries; the productivity slowdown seems to have come to an end. In fact, 
the outstanding increase of employment reflecting the rising share of flexible 
jobs and the regularisation policies for immigrant workers is probably over. But 
the structural problems, that are still present and that can keep productivity 
growth subdued also in the future, cannot be forgotten: the insufficient use of 
information and communication technology coupled with small firm size and 
inadequate human capital, the insufficient competition in many sheltered 
sectors that increase the costs of firms more exposed to international 
competition. As far as product competitiveness is concerned, we found that 
the geographical specialization of Italian exports does not seem very relevant to 
explain the weakness of Italian exports. It is in the sectoral specialisation that 
the Italian pattern appears less favourable than the German and French ones, 
because it is more concentrated on low-tech sectors and particularly on 
traditional sectors and consequently more exposed to competition from low 
wage countries. In addition, global trade is growing faster for products where 
Italian exports are less specialised. 
Even in this respect, there are signs of improvement: a corporate 
restructuring is taking place, with the disappearance of less competitive 
companies (usually very small). At the same time the production of traditional 
goods is moving to higher quality goods and firms are relocating part of their 
production abroad where the costs are lower. However, the outsourcing 
process remains modest compared with the main European countries, even if 
in the last few years it has been increasing. 
Notwithstanding the recognized signs of improvement, in order to reduce 
the real costs of the adjustment process that the shocks and the new economic 
policy setting have required, some microeconomic measures could be useful. 
More market liberalization would reduce the mark-ups in sheltered markets 
and then reduce prices for households and costs for firms. In addition, more 
competition would encourage innovation and investment in research and 
development, and then increase the opportunities for employment and 
productivity growth. In this regard, liberalization initiatives undertaken by the 
Italian government in recent years may go in the right direction, although much 
more remains to be done.   
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FINLAND 
Kotilainen (2006) analyses the macroeconomic performance and adjustment in 
the EMU31. Finland has performed well as a member of the euro area since its 
foundation in 1999. This is a good achievement for a small peripheral country 
where production and export structures as well as their developments differ 
significantly from the euro area average. Finland has strictly obeyed the rules 
originally set at the Maastricht conference. These concern inflation, interest 
rates, public sector balance and general government gross debt. Successful 
economic development realized after the severe depression of the early 1990s 
helped achieve adherence to the Maastricht criteria. Finland has, however, also 
taken active policy measures to fulfill the criteria. 
Finland has profited from the microeconomic benefits of the euro, like 
reduced costs of foreign exchange, elimination of foreign exchange risk 
between euro countries. Lower interest rates have had a positive effect on 
investments. Joining the euro has allowed Finland adopt the credibility of 
monetary policy pursued by the European Central Bank, thus creating a more 
stable macroeconomic platform. Achieving the same credibility for the 
domestic central bank would have been problematic. Credibility of monetary 
policy is important especially in times of international and domestic crises. 
The domestic and the relevant international environments have been 
rather stable during the euro period. The Russian currency crises during the 
euro preparation period in 1998 and the ICT crises in 2001 have been the 
major crises. The former negatively affected exports to Russia and some other 
countries that were affected by the crisis. The ICT crisis strongly affected 
exports of electronics industry in 2001. Wage agreements have also been 
moderate so that international competitiveness has been maintained. The good 
macroeconomic situation in terms of export growth of especially electronics 
industry, high current account surplus, low inflation and good public sector 
balances have given a good starting point for stable economic development. In 
fact there has not been any severe test for the EMU membership in Finland. 
Finland’s production structure is rather different to that of the euro area 
aggregate. The shares of transport and communication, paper industry and of 
the electronics industry are clearly higher in Finland than in the euro area 
average. Also the country’s composition of exports differs notably from that of 
the euro area aggregate. These differences can be a source of asymmetric 
shocks. Therefore policies pursued within the EMU may not be at times the 
most appropriate or accommodating for Finland. 
Observed business cycle development has also been different from that of 
the euro area aggregate. The correlation of GDP growth between Finland and 
the euro area has been relatively low. While the GDP volatility has been higher 
than the euro area average, GDP growth has also been higher. The strong 
trend growth of GDP thus helped in this respect. 
As a member of the euro area, Finnish interest rates have been lower than 
the Taylor rule would indicate. Interest rates without EMU would undoubtedly 
have been somewhat higher. General inflation has not been a problem but 
housing prices have been rising very fast. 
The key adjustment mechanism, labour market adjustment and fiscal 
policy have been working in a responsible way. Good public finances have 
enabled tax cuts, which in turn have helped obtain moderate wage increases. At 
31 See Annex A8 
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the macro level the Finnish centralised wage negotiation system and corporatist 
practices can respond to big macro level developments appropriately. The 
problem in the Finnish labour market is that micro level stickiness of wages is 
very high, especially real wage rigidity. This can be a problem in responding to 
firm and sector specific shocks. 
In Finland the probability of asymmetric shocks is higher than average in 
the euro area. This creates challenges for the adjustment mechanism. Public 
sector finances must be sound to enable necessary fiscal policy measures, firm 
level labour market flexibility should be increased, regional and vocational 
mobility of labour should also be increased. Maintaining high trend growth of 
the economy is, however, the most important thing, as it allows larger scope 
for manoeuvring with respect to the adjustment mechanisms. 
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EMU was achieved successfully with very little economic disruption. However, 
so far there have been no major asymmetric shocks affecting individual 
economies within the EMU. As a result, the potential effects of the loss of 
policy options inherent in a common currency area have not yet been fully 
tested. 
  3.5 Summary and    
Policy Implications  
Divergent output growth experienced across the membership of the EMU 
is primarily due to differences in underlying trend growth rates. In some cases, 
such as Italy and Portugal, serious problems have arisen as a result of enhanced 
competition from outside the EU. While EMU precludes a quick fix in terms 
of a nominal exchange rate change, it is unlikely that such a quick fix could 
solve the more deep-seated structural problems in such economies. Under 
EMU solutions must be found through policies promoting structural change 
and adaptation. 
Restoring competitiveness in Italy would mainly require changing patterns 
of industrial product specialisation. Further, the reduction of relative prices 
(both of labour and of goods) can help, especially if they come from a market 
liberalisation process aimed at reducing mark-ups in sheltered sectors and 
therefore prices for households and costs for firms. While necessary, these 
structural changes may entail costs in terms of GDP loss. Using fiscal policy to 
counterbalance these costs is constrained by the high public debt in Italy.   
The experience of Finland demonstrates that the elimination of the 
exchange risk, reduction of transaction costs, lower interest rate, credibility 
gains and their positive effects on investment, in combination with fiscal 
consolidation and efficient labour markets can outweigh the cost of foregoing 
monetary policy independence.  
This has been true for some other members including Ireland and Spain. 
However, for Germany, in particular, there has been no benefit from any 
reduction in risk premia. 
Divergence in inflation rates is also to a significant extent due to country 
specific factors. This has resulted in divergence in real interest rates 
experienced by households across the Euro area. While this has had differential 
effects on the housing market, these are probably limited in nature as the other 
drivers of the construction sector are more important in the longer term. 
Nonetheless, the experience to date of EMU suggests that some 
governments may need to adjust their policies to deal with potential housing 
market bubbles. The loss of the instrument of monetary policy could be offset 
by a more targeted approach using fiscal policy. However, this has not yet been 
the practise in EMU, even in countries such as Spain and Ireland, which are 
suffering from serious inflationary pressures in that sector. For the new 
member states membership of EMU in the future could precipitate housing 
market booms and it will be important to prepare the ground for an 
appropriate use of fiscal policy to manage any risks that such an eventuality 
might entail. 
Financial integration can act as an adjustment mechanism to country-
specific shocks by smoothening consumption over time through cross-border 
portfolio diversification. Furthermore financial integration plays an important 
role in the transmission of the common monetary policy. Financial market 
openness is clearly a factor behind the propagation of shocks. Integrated 
economies are more exposed to spillovers from external shocks, while they 
return to equilibrium more quickly in response to domestic shocks.  
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Research on the determinants of consumption suggests that the impact of 
changes in wealth on consumption levels in the euro area is small, at lest in the 
short term. There is stronger evidence of long run wealth effects. Further, 
households tend to react stronger to capital losses in comparison to capital 
gains. This asymmetric reaction is likely to influence the marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth. Single country equity price shocks have little impact on 
the domestic economy as wealth effects on consumption are small and some 
equities are owned by foreigners. Consequently, the impact of any shock to 
equity prices is likely to be small. It has been shown that when euro area equity 
markets are shocked the effects are small. A global shock however has a more 
noticeable impact.  
Recent research suggests that EMU has fostered intra-industry trade and 
there has been some, albeit limited, convergence in terms of the economic 
cycle. These developments have, if anything, enhanced the effectiveness of 
ECB monetary policy. 
Because of structural differences in economies in the euro area there 
remains the possibility that supply side shocks could differentially affect one 
member economy, for example in the way that Finland was affected in 1989-
90. Under such circumstances the discipline of EMU could slow adjustment to 
such a shock. If and when such shocks do occur increased reliance will have to 
be placed on promoting the flexibility of the economies so affected. 
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